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CONTRACT REMEDIES NEED NOT UNDERCOMPENSATE ASPIRING PARENTS WHEN
CRYOPRESERVED REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL IS LOST OR DESTROYED: RECOVERY
OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE WHEN BREACH OF
CONTRACT RESULTS IN THE LOST OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME PREGNANT WITH ONE’S
OWN BIOLOGICAL CHILD

Joseph M. Hnylka1
“Not long after University Hospitals called clients to inform them about the cryotank failure, they began
gathering in a private Facebook group. It was, according to the would-be parents, a mass tragedy. But
unlike other mass tragedies, there is no accepted protocol or language to deal with the loss. ...... ‘I am broken
inside.’...... ‘when the life you thought, you were going to have is taken away from you, it is truly like a
death.’”2

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has reported that the
use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) has doubled over the past
decade. In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) is the most prevalent form of ART. During
IVF, a woman’s eggs are extracted, fertilized in a laboratory setting, and then
implanted in the uterus. Many IVF procedures use eggs or sperm that were stored
using a process called cryopreservation. A recent survey reported that
cryopreservation consultations increased exponentially during the coronavirus
pandemic, rising as much as 60 percent. It is estimated that more than one million
embryos are stored in cryopreservation facilities throughout the United States. As
the use of cryopreservation increases, so too does the possibility that stored
reproductive material will be lost or destroyed. Recently, over four-thousand
cryopreserved human embryos inadvertently were destroyed at University
Hospital Fertility Clinic in Ohio, and three-thousand-five-hundred eggs and
embryos were destroyed when a cryopreservation tank recently malfunctioned at
a fertility clinic in California. When reproductive material is lost or destroyed,
the aspiring parents’ primary harm is emotional; it is non-pecuniary in nature.
The emotional harm is particularly extreme in cases where the loss destroys a
couple’s only hope of becoming parents. Despite the severity of the emotional
harm suffered due to the loss, aspiring parents often are left without a clear legal
basis to recover emotional disturbance damages.
Although emotional disturbance damages are rarely awarded for breach of
contract, the article explains why such awards are justified based on the current
trend in contract law, as exemplified by Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
353 and posits that clinics and ART professionals are aware at the time of
contracting that emotional disturbance is particularly likely in the event of a
breach. Scholars have noted that tort damages for emotional harm often are
1Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; J.D. University of San Diego, 1988.
The author would like to thank Professors Mike Flynn, Linda Harrison, Michele Struffolino, and Jim Willets for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
2
Ariana Eunjung Cha, These Would-be Parents’ Embryos Were Lost. Now They’re Grieving – and Suing, WASHINGTON
POST (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/these-would-be-parents-embryos-werelost-now-theyre-grieving--and-suing/2018/08/24/57040ab0-733c-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html (recounting aspiring
parents comments regarding their lost opportunity to have children using their cryopreserved embryos).
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unavailable when reproductive material is lost or destroyed, because the emotional
harm is not parasitic to a physical injury, nor can aspiring parents overcome the
traditional barriers to NIED recovery because they neither were in the “zone of
danger” nor were they bystanders at the time of loss. Therefore, for aspiring
parents who reside in traditional barrier jurisdictions, breach of contract damages
may represent their only hope to recover for emotional harm. This article posits
that ART clinics and professionals have actual or constructive knowledge of
plaintiffs’ particular reason for storing reproductive material – namely, to achieve
a later pregnancy – at the time of contracting, so as to support consequential
damages for emotional disturbance. This knowledge of the contract’s purpose,
coupled with the nature of the transaction and the surrounding circumstances, put
ART clinics and professionals on notice at the time of contracting that emotional
disturbance is particularly likely to result from a breach. The article also posits
that typical broad, sweeping exculpatory clauses contained in cryopreservation
agreements that attempt to negate all liability for freezing and storage of
reproductive material, including negligence liability, should not be enforced
because such clauses render the agreement illusory and contravene public policy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a young man and a young woman, both in their twenties, both diagnosed
as having cancer. Both are told that their cancer treatment will render them infertile.
However, they are given the promising news that their reproductive material – a man’s
sperm, a woman’s eggs, or a couple’s embryo – can be cryogenically preserved and
stored, so they may someday become parents despite their looming infertility. They are
overcome with joy at the prospect they someday will be parents of their own biological
children, which was their lifelong desire. Now, after both receiving the cancer treatments
that render them infertile, imagine their emotional pain and devastation when they
receive the tragic news that their cryogenically preserved reproductive material was lost
or destroyed by those responsible for storing it. They will never be parents of their own
biological children! This scenario is, unfortunately, all too common in the United States
as reproductive material is lost, destroyed, or rendered unusable due to human error or
storage equipment failure. Regarding stored embryos,3 one recent study reported that, in a
ten-year period extending from 2009 to 2019, approximately 133 lawsuits were filed in
the United States seeking recovery for cryopreserved embryo loss, damage, or
destruction.4 A few years ago, over four-thousand cryopreserved human embryos were
destroyed at University Hospital Fertility Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, when a storage tank
alarm was turned off and the tank’s cooling system later malfunctioned.5 Similarly,
approximately 3,500 eggs and embryos were destroyed when a cryopreservation tank
malfunctioned at a fertility clinic in California.6 Although a fertility clinic may apologize
3 The term “embryo” as used in this article includes “pre-embryos”, “pre-zygotes” and “zygotes.” While some court
opinions and scholarly works use the term “embryo” to describe a cryopreserved fertilized egg, others use different
terminology.
4 Gerard Letterie M.D. & Dov Fox, J.D., D. Phil., Lawsuit Frequency and claims basis over lost, damaged, and destroyed
frozen embryos over a 10-year period, FERTILITY AND STERILITY REPORTS (July 8, 2020, Am. Soc’y Reproductive Med.),
https://www.fertstertreports.org/article/S2666-3341(20)30039-8/fulltext [hereinafter Letterie & Fox, Lawsuit Frequency].
5 Holly Yan, A Cleveland Fertility Clinic That Lost 4,000 Eggs and Embryos Just Got Hit with Two More Lawsuits,
(updated Feb. 5, 2020) https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/05/us/ohio-fertility-clinic-lost-eggs-embryos-lawsuits/index.html
[hereinafter Yan, Cleveland Fertility Clinic]; Ariana Eunjung Cha, These Would-be Parents’ Embryos Were Lost. Now
They’re Grieving – and Suing, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/these-would-be-parents-embryos-were-lost-now-theyre-grieving--and-suing/2018/08/24/57040ab0-733c-11e8805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html [hereinafter Cha, Would-be Parents]; Jessica Ravitz, New Lawsuits Filed Against Cleveland
Fertility Clinic Where 4,000 Embryos Were Lost (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/24/health/clevelandfertility-clinic-embryos-lawsuit-bn/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Ravitz, New Lawsuits]; see also John
Robertson, Hospital destroys baby hopes of cancer patients, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh, Scotland), 2011 WLNR 26139152
(Sept. 26, 2012) (faulty storage tank ruins sperm samples); 4/22/21 Can. Press 12:56:39, Section: Lifestyle, Lab director
blames hospital for fertility clinic failure AP NEWS (Apr. 22, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/us-news-health-clevelandscience-technology-b15af26f90c64dbdcaf6e55630991bb7.
6 The Associated Press, $15M Awarded to Five People who lost eggs, embryos at Fertility Clinic NBC NEWS (June 11,
2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/15m-awarded-five-people-who-lost-eggs-embryos-fertility-clinicn1270439 [hereinafter Associated Press, $15M Awarded]. As this article was being finalized, a federal jury in a tort action
recently rendered a trial verdict awarding 15 million to three women who lost eggs and one couple who lost embryos when
a storage tank malfunctioned in California. Id. The jury found the fertility clinic only 10% responsible for the loss and
found the tank manufacturer was 90 % responsible. Id. As of the completion of this article, the verdict is not final and
likely will be appealed. Although the action was in tort and not in contract, it nevertheless is extremely significant for
several reasons, including the fact this was the first such case to go to a jury. Id. Most cases involving loss or destruction of
reproductive material have either settled or been dismissed. See Letterie & Fox, Lawsuit Frequency, supra note 4 (noting
that, of 90 closed embryo destruction cases between 2009 and 2019, “all but two (97.8%) were settled out of court.”).
Also, fourteen-million-dollars of the fifteen-million-dollar award was “damages for pain, suffering and emotional
distress.”; supra Regardless of the results of an appeal, this case certainly will serve as a warning and wake-up call to
fertility clinics, ART professionals, and storage tank manufacturers. The jury’s verdict also confirms that plaintiffs’
primary injury in such cases is emotional. See Derek Hawkins, Jury Awards $15 Million in Landmark case over Embryos,
eggs Destroyed in Fertility Clinic Tank Failure, WASHINGTON POST (June 11, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/06/11/fertility-clinic-egg-embryo-verdict/ (noting plaintiffs’ severe
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and offer storage fee refunds, free services, and emotional counseling, many aspiring
parents lost their only opportunity to become pregnant with their own biological child
and want “more than an apology and a refund.”7
If these individuals are to receive damages to properly compensate them for their
injuries, the damage award must include recovery for emotional disturbance. 8 In each
situation, one can imagine the grief and emotional devastation experienced by aspiring
parents who can no longer use the stored reproductive material to have their own biological
children. When aspiring parents’ reproductive material is lost or destroyed, the primary
harm typically is nonpecuniary in nature; the primary harm is emotional.9 The grieving
individuals’ main concern usually is not to recover their storage fees and the costs
associated with extracting their reproductive material for storage, nor is their focus on the
pecuniary value of the lost reproductive material.10 Instead, the primary harm for which
they seek to recover is the severe emotional disturbance11 caused by the loss or destruction
of their reproductive material which, in turn, deprived them of the opportunity to use that
reproductive material to have their own biological children.
This article focuses on recovery for emotional disturbance based on breach of
contract. Of course, attorneys representing aspiring parents whose reproductive material
has been lost or destroyed also may pursue recovery for emotional harm in tort.12 However,

emotional harm and stating the case may “serve as a bellwether” for other similar actions.”).
7 Cha, Would-be Parents, supra note 1. The clinic claimed that the embryos were the victims, not the aspiring parents, and
stated any suit should be governed by medical malpractice damage caps and limitations for noneconomic injuries. Id.
Several aspiring parents filed a wrongful death action claiming the lost embryos should be accorded the status of persons.
Id. The lawsuit was recently dismissed.
8 While some may argue that emotional disturbance should be awarded in such cases as a part of general damages because
emotional disturbance flows, of necessity, from all breaches where reproductive material is lost or destroyed, this article
instead posits that consequential damage awards for emotional disturbance are more appropriate because not all
reproductive material is stored to achieve a later pregnancy. In addition, not everyone who has stored reproductive
material does so because they will be rendered infertile. Because plaintiff’s circumstances vary, including the purpose
plaintiff used cryopreservation, the existence and severity of plaintiff’s emotional disturbance caused by defendant’s
breach will be based on plaintiff’s unique circumstances at the time of contracting. Therefore, consequential damages for
emotional disturbance are appropriate.
9 See Dov Fox, Redressing Future Intangible Losses, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 419, 457 (Winter 2020) (arguing the principal
harm is not the lost capacity to conceive and gestate; instead, the principal harm is the “subjective injuries to individual
well-being.”) [hereinafter Fox, Intangible Losses]; see also Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779, 785-86 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2008) (discussing the emotional harm aspiring parents experience when deprived of the “opportunity of
experiencing pregnancy, prenatal bonding, and the birth of a child”); Perry–Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29-30
(2001) (same).
10 See
Cha, Would-be Parents, supra note 3 (“many people who lost genetic material say they are entitled to
something more than an apology and a refund”). Also, as one plaintiff noted: “Sperm [and other reproductive material] has
no value if it cannot actually be used.” Robertson v. Saadat, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
11 The phrase “emotional disturbance” rather than “emotional distress” is used in this article because the former is used in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (Law Inst. 1981) to describe damages for emotional harm caused by
breach of contract. Use of the phrase “emotional disturbance” also avoids confusion with stand-alone claims of emotional
distress in tort, such as claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
12 Although a comparison of these two theories of recovery is not the focus of this article, many scholars already have
noted serious obstacles to recovery for emotional harm also exist in tort law when aspiring parents seek to recover based on
the loss or destruction of their reproductive material. See, e.g., Joseph M. Hnylka, Restatement (Third) of Torts Section
47(b) Bypasses Traditional Barriers and Offers Aspiring Parents a Clear Path to Recover Stand-Alone NIED when Their
Cryopreserved Reproductive Material is Lost or Destroyed, 46 AM. J. L. & MED 337, 339-40, 345-54 (Issue 4, Nov. 2020)
(noting difficulty of stand-alone recovery for NIED) [hereinafter Hnylka, Traditional Barriers]; Emma D. McBride, "I'd
Like My Eggs Frozen": Negligent Emotional Distress Compensation for Lost Frozen Human Eggs, 61 B.C. L. REV. 749,
768 (2020)(same)[hereinafter McBride, Eggs Frozen]; Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo, Scholarly Theories,
Case Law, and Proposed State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407 (2013) (same) [hereinafter Howell, The
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as scholars have noted, tort law often leaves aspiring parents without compensation for
emotional harm when reproductive material is lost or destroyed.13 When reproductive
material is lost or destroyed, the wrongful conduct typically occurs miles away from the
aspiring parents and, therefore, they suffer no physical injury or impact. As a result,
recovery for parasitic emotional disturbance typically is unavailable.14 In addition, because
stand-alone emotional harm claims without a physical injury are suspect in many
jurisdictions,15 the courts have adopted traditional barriers to recovery which render
recovery for emotional disturbance virtually impossible in most cases involving loss or
destruction of reproductive material.16 When reproductive material is lost or destroyed,
aspiring parents suffer no physical injury/impact,17 are not in the “zone of danger”18, and
cannot meet traditional bystander recovery rules.19 In these traditional barrier jurisdictions,
breach of contract may represent the aspiring parents’ only hope to recover for emotional
harm. This article posits that damages for emotional disturbance should not be restricted to
tort recovery when reproductive material has been lost or destroyed. Consequential
damages for breach of contract should include an award for emotional disturbance when
the loss or destruction of cryopreserved reproductive material deprives aspiring parents of
Frozen Embryo]; Colleen M. Quinn, Tort Liability for Lost or Destroyed Embryos, 39 FAM. ADVOC. 6 (Fall 2016)
(same)[hereinafter Quinn, Tort Liability].
13 See, e.g., Fox, Intangible Losses, supra note 9, at 452 (noting “ just three courts--among scores--have awarded any
limited recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress” for plaintiffs deprived of procreation, and stating
“[t]hese three courts are extreme outliers, and two of them leaned hard on exceptional circumstances of religion and race to
justify exempting plaintiffs deprived of procreation from the usual physical injury requirement.”); Hnylka, Traditional
Barriers, supra note 12, at 339-40 (discussing the difficulty faced by aspiring parents who seek tort recovery for emotional
harm when reproductive material is lost or destroyed); see also Erika N. Auger, Note, The “ART” of future life: Rethinking
Personal Injury Law For the Negligent Deprivation of a Patient’s Right to Procreation In the Age of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 94 CHI-KENT L. REV. 51, 53-54, 63-68, 72-74 (2019) (same) [hereinafter Auger, Rethinking Personal
Injury].
14 Plaintiff’s emotional harm is not caused by a physical injury when a plaintiff’s reproductive materials are lost or
destroyed, regardless of whether the emotional harm manifests itself with physical symptoms. See Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994), cited in, Hamilton v. Nestor, 659 N.W.2d 321, 325 (2003). Absent a physical injury,
courts use public policy to limit recovery for purely emotional harm. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 512 U.S. at 545,
quoted by Hamilton, 265 Neb. at 761, 659 N.W.2d at 325; see also Fox, Intangible Losses, supra note 9, at 452 (noting
“just three courts--among scores--have awarded any limited recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress” for
plaintiffs deprived of procreation, and stating “[t]hese three courts are extreme outliers....... ”). In tort, the plaintiff may
attempt to recover for emotional disturbance parasitic to physical injury or as a distinct claim, such as a stand-alone claim
for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 544 (distinguishing
recovery for NIED from recovery for pain and suffering parasitic to a physical injury); Hamilton, 659 N.W.2d at 324–25
(same).
15 The “fundamental differences between emotional and physical injuries” have led courts to limit recovery for purely
emotional harm for public policy reasons. Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 545; see also Hnylka, Traditional Barriers,
supra note 12, at 368-70 (discussing courts’ concern that stand-alone emotional injury may be feigned and explaining why
this fear is unfounded in cases where reproductive material is lost or destroyed).
16 For a discussion of the traditional barriers, see Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 545-47 (explaining barriers used by
jurisdictions to bar or limit NIED recovery); Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another where Bystander Plaintiff must Suffer Physical Impact
or be in Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R.5th 255 (2001 & Supp. 2020) (discussing barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery and
providing list of authorities). At the time of this article’s publication, at least nineteen jurisdictions use the “zone of
danger” barrier to recovery which requires plaintiff be at risk to suffer bodily harm in order to recover for
NIED. See JACOB A. STEIN, 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 10:32 (3d ed. Apr. 2020 Update) (listing
cases); Joseph M. Hnylka, Restatement (Third) of Torts Section 47(b) Bypasses Traditional Barriers and Offers Aspiring
Parents A Clear Path to Recover Stand-Alone Nied When Their Cryopreserved Reproductive Material Is Lost or
Destroyed, 46 Am. J.L. & Med. 337, 344-45 (2020) (same); BARRY A. LINDAHL, 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 31:31, Negligent conduct causing emotional injury--Plaintiff as bystander: Apprehension of harm to
another--Impact rule; zone of danger requirement (2d ed. June 2021 Update) (same).
17 See Hnylka, Traditional Barriers, supra note 12, at 345-49.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 349-54.
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an opportunity to become pregnant with their biological child.
As will be discussed, when reproductive material is cryogenically preserved and
stored, most Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) clinics and practitioners have the
aspiring parents sign a contract.20 This article posits that, in situations where reproductive
material is cryopreserved to achieve a later pregnancy, ART clinics and practitioners have
actual or constructive knowledge at the time of contracting of plaintiffs’ particular reason
for storing the reproductive material, so as to support consequential damages for emotional
disturbance. This knowledge of the contract’s purpose, coupled with the nature of the
transaction and the surrounding circumstances, put ART clinics and practitioners on notice
at the time of contracting that emotional disturbance is particularly likely to result from a
breach. Such an award will not give the aspiring parents more than they bargained for.
Instead, unless aspiring parents are awarded consequential damages for emotional
disturbance, breach of contract recovery will leave them undercompensated. The article
also posits that typical broad, sweeping exculpatory clauses contained in cryopreservation
agreements that attempt to negate any and all liability for freezing and storage of
reproductive material, even liability based on a lack of due care, should not be enforced
because such clauses arguably render the agreement illusory and contravene public policy.
Part II of this article will discuss the cryopreservation of reproductive material in
the United States. Part III will address contract theory’s reluctance to award damages for
emotional disturbance caused by a breach. Part IV will address the foreseeability of
emotional disturbance damages caused by the breach of a cryopreservation contract. Part
V will address exculpatory clauses found in cryopreservation contracts. Part VI contains
the conclusion.
II.

CRYOPRESERVATION OF REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES

Cryopreservation is the process used to freeze and thaw reproductive material –
such as sperm, eggs, and embryos – for later use in in vitro fertilization (IVF).21 IVF is an
assisted reproductive technology in which a woman’s eggs are extracted, fertilized in a
laboratory setting, and then implanted in the uterus.22 IVF is used to treat many causes of
infertility.23 Many IVF procedures use sperm, eggs, or embryos that were cryopreserved.
20 The titles of these contracts vary from clinic to clinic. Some are titled “contract” while others are called “agreement,”
“consent form,” “declaration of intent” or something similar. Many examples are available on the internet. See Main Line
Fertility Center, Freezing and Disposition of Embryos Agreement and Declaration of Intent,
https://mainlinefertility.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/SART-Disposition-of-Embryos-2019.pdf (sample contract) (last
visited June 14, 2021) [hereinafter Main Line Fertility Center]; Ovation Fertility, Reproductive Materials Cryopreservation
& Storage Agreement, http://www.austinivf.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/6.-Freeze-Storage-Agreement-1.5-2018.pdf
(sample contract)(last visited June 14, 2021) [hereinafter Ovation Fertility]; Boston IVF, Consent Form for Embryo
Freezing & Disposition of Eggs, Sperm, and Embryos,
https://www.bostonivf.com/content/editor/PatientForms/IVFConsents/F-MD-1004-Rev-9-Consent-embryo-freezing.pdf
(sample contract)(last visited June 14, 2021) [hereinafter Boston IVF]. For a more detailed discussion of these agreements,
see infra, Part III and accompanying notes; see also Auger, Rethinking Personal Injury, supra note 13, at 64; Dov Fox,
Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 162 (2017) [hereinafter Fox, Reproductive Negligence].
21 IRMS Reproductive Medicine, Cryopreservation of Embryos, Sperm, and Oocytes, https://www.sbivf.com/embryocryopreservation/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
22 Id.
23

American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology: A Guide for Patients, at 4 (2018),
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/globalassets/rf/news-and-publications/bookletsfact-sheets/english-fact-sheets-and-info-
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Based on the most current data compiled by the CDC,
there were 330,773 reported
ART cycles performed in 2019 in the United States alone, 121,086 of which involved
freezing eggs or embryos for later reproductive use.24 Societal changes, improved
cryopreservation techniques, and an increased desire “to preserve fertility” have led to an
increased demand for the use of ART.25 According to a recent survey, cryopreservation
consultations “increased exponentially” during the coronavirus pandemic, rising between
30 and 60 percent, depending upon the clinic.26 Although the precise number of
cryopreserved embryos currently in storage is unknown, it has been estimated that one
million embryos were stored in the United States as of 2017.27 The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has reported that “virtually all” cryopreserved embryos
are stored at clinics rather than being stored off-site.28 A recent survey of clinics by
ASRM noted that “most clinics were able to tell us why embryos were in storage”29
which indicates that most clinics had actual knowledge of intended use of the
cryopreserved reproductive material stored at their clinic. The primary reason for
cryopreservation of reproductive material such as embryos is to achieve pregnancy using
ART.30 In fact, some contracts for the storage of embryos include specific language
stating that the purpose of storage is to preserve embryos for a future attempt at
pregnancy.31 Even when a storage contract does not expressly state the purpose of storage
is to achieve a future pregnancy, the purpose often is implied by an agreement’s
discussion of IVF and thawing of the reproductive material.32 Some clinics require their
clients to execute a separate agreement detailing the later use of the stored materials.33
Many, if not most, fertility clinics advertisements taut the use of cryopreservation as a
method to secure a future pregnancy. As one clinic noted in its online webpage:
“Cryopreservation allows for peace of mind about a future family.”34 Couples may store
reproductive material to achieve pregnancy for many reasons: these reasons may include
booklets/art-booklet2.pdf [hereinafter Guide for Patients].
24 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART): Preliminary 2019 Data,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html#preliminary (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
25 Ernesto Bosch, Michel De Vos, & Peter Humaidan, The Future of Cryopreservation in Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, FRONTIERS IN ENDOCRINOLOGY (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fendo.2020.00067/full.
26 Sarah Perillo, Lockdowns Sparking IVF Surge, HERALD SUN (June 6, 2021 Melbourne), 2021 WLNR 18230240 (noting
“[t]he demand for IVF and egg freezing has spiked as a result of ongoing Covid lockdowns, with many women choosing
to freeze their eggs as insurance against lost time.”).
27
Elissa Strauss, The Leftover Embryo Crisis, (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.elle.com/culture/a12445676/the-leftoverembryo-crisis/.
28 David I. Hoffman, M.D., Gail L. Zellman, M.D. et al, Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and their
Availability for Research, FERTILITY AND STERILITY REPORTS, at 1066 (vol. 79, issue 5, May 2003, Am. Soc’y
Reproductive Med.), https://www.fertstert.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0015-0282%2803%2900172-9 (last visited Aug. 5,
2021) (survey results indicate that less than two percent of cryopreserved embryos are stored off-site) [hereinafter Hoffman
& Zellman, Cryopreserved Embryos].
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1068 (noting that 88.2% of stored embryos are used by patients to achieve pregnancy). ASRM survey results
indicate that less than three percent of cryopreserved embryos are stored for research purposes, and less than one percent
are stored for use in quality assurance activities. Id.
31 See, e.g., Boston IVF, supra note 20 (contract states “The purpose of embryo freezing is to save embryos for a future
attempt to establish a pregnancy.”).
32 See infra Part IV. B. and notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
33

See, e.g., Ovation Fertility, supra note 20 (contract states: “The Client desires to store the reproductive materials for
later use or other disposition as instructed by the Client in a separate notarized agreement.”).
34
Loma Linda University, Center for Fertility and IVF, Cryopreservation: Benefits of Cryopreservation,
https://lomalindafertility.com/treatments/cryopreservation/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
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delay or postpone pregnancy, to increase the likelihood of pregnancy, to provide
opportunity for pre-implantation genetic testing, to avoid the negative fertility effects of
most cancer treatments, and to overcome medical conditions that prevent traditional
pregnancy.35
The cryopreservation process is similar for embryos, eggs (oocytes), and sperm.
Embryos may be created and cryopreserved at any time within seven days of egg retrieval.36
To accomplish cryopreservation, the embryo is placed in a cryoprotectant solution and
typically is flash cooled in a process called vitrification.37 Embryos are then stored in liquid
nitrogen at a temperature of minus 320 degrees Fahrenheit.38 When the embryo is later
needed for implantation into the uterus, in excess of ninety percent of embryos survive
warming after vitrification.39 The post-vitrification survival rate for eggs is similar, and is
between 85 and 90%.40 The length of storage reportedly has not diminished the high
survival rate, even when eggs and embryos have been stored for many years. 41 ASRM
reports that the freezing of sperm, eggs, and embryos is “very safe” and that the risks of
disease, birth defects and other anomalies is the same as with pregnancies achieved using
fresh sperm, eggs, or embryos.42 In addition, the use of cryopreserved sperm to create an
embryo has not been shown to reduce the likelihood of pregnancy.43 In fact, it has been
reported that sperm is less sensitive to cryopreservation than other types of cells because
of sperm’s low water count.44 Cryopreservation of sperm has been ongoing since the 1950s,
and sperm that has been cryogenically stored may last indefinitely.45
III.

CONTRACT THEORY’S RELUCTANCE TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE

Plaintiffs who seek to recover damages for emotional disturbance caused by a breach of
contract continue to face an uphill battle. Although emotional disturbance is recognized as
a compensable harm, it is the goal of tort law, not contract law, to “make the victim
whole.”46 Contract law, on the other hand, gives plaintiff the “benefit of her bargain” and
the parties to a contract are free to allocate risk as they see fit at the time of contracting.47
35 Viera Fertility, What are the Benefits of Cryopreservation?, https://www.vierafertility.com/blog/what-are-the-benefitsof-cryopreservation/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
36 IRMS Reproductive Medicine, Cryopreservation of Embryos, Sperm, and Oocytes: Embryo Cryopreservation,
https://www.sbivf.com/embryo-cryopreservation/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
37 Id. Reproductive material may be slow frozen or rapidly (flash) frozen. Id. Vitrification involves the latter. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Guide for Patients, supra note 23, at 12.
43 Id. at 14.
44 Tennessee Reproductive Medicine, Sperm Freezing at a Glance, https://trmbaby.com/library/preservation/spermfreezing/
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 695 (La. 2004) (noting the goal of tort law is to make the victim whole);
Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So. 3d 945, 953 (La. 2009) (same); Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005)
(same); Hancey v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D. Colo. 1997) (same).
47
In re POC Properties, LLC, 580 B.R. 504, 510 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017) (noting that parties to a contract allocate risk
and are protected against non-performance by benefit of the bargain damages); Indiana Dep't of Transp. v. Shelly & Sands,
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Contracts typically are commercial in nature and involve goods or services offered by
professionals or businesses.48 Therefore, it arguably makes sense that pecuniary loss is the
focus in a breach of contract action, rather than recovery for nonpecuniary emotional
disturbance caused by a breach.49 However, although damages for emotional disturbance
remain unrecoverable in the vast majority of breach of contract actions, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 353 reflects the current trend to broaden the availability of
such damages.50
Section 353 states: “Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless
the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that
serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.” 51 Because the typical
situation involving the loss or destruction of cryogenically stored reproductive material
occurs at a storage facility when the aspiring parents are not present or aware of the loss,
the exception regarding “bodily harm” is inapplicable.52 The aspiring parents who learn
their reproductive material was lost or destroyed typically suffer no bodily harm caused by
the breach. Instead, if damages for emotional disturbance are to be awarded in accordance
with the modern trend, it will be because “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that
severe emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”53 This language reflects the
foreseeability approach to consequential damages set forth in the famous case Hadley v.
Baxendale.54 Hadley involved a miller’s broken crankshaft which the defendants promised
to repair and return by a specific time.55 When the crankshaft was not repaired and returned
on time, the mill was forced to remain closed, and the miller sought to recover his lost
profits. The court denied recovery of the miller’s lost profits and ruled:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such
breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be
Inc., 756 N.E.2d 1063, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (same); C.T. Charlton & Assocs., Inc. v. Thule, Inc., 541 F. App'x 549,
553 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Lassen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (same); Trans
World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co.,
547 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (same).
48 Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949).
49 See id. at 14; 55 S.E.2d at 813 (noting that pecuniary interests are dominant in a breach of contract action, not recovery
for mental anguish).
50
See 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11 (May 2021 Update) (noting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353
represents “perhaps a more liberal statement of the rule” regarding recovery for emotional disturbance caused by a breach
of contract. ); see also Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1957) (stating “objections to recovery for mental
disturbance, applicable equally to tort and contract actions, have been so thoroughly demolished in recent years” and
noting the “marked trend towards recovery”); Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1201 (11th Cir.
2007) (noting that courts have now begun to “embrace” the idea that emotional disturbance damages may be awarded for
breach of personal contracts).
51
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
52 If bodily harm occurs, the plaintiff also has the option of suing in tort, and typically does so. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981 & June 2021 Update). However, as scholars have noted, the
lack of bodily harm to plaintiffs when reproductive material is lost or destroyed also serves as an obstacle to recovery in
tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Hnylka, Traditional Barriers, supra note 12, at 345-47 (noting
difficulty of stand-alone recovery for NIED); McBride, Eggs Frozen, supra note 12, at 768 (same).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
54 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 E.R. 145 (1854); see also HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13:13
(March 2021 Update) (noting that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 and others “give courts considerable
discretion” and “may allow courts to be more creative in providing plaintiffs with recoveries that are truly adequate to
compensate them for breaches without simultaneously ruining defendants.”) [hereinafter HUNTER].
55 Hadley v. Baxendale, 1854 WL 7208, 156 E.R. 145 (1854).
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considered either arising naturally . i.e., according to the usual course
of things , from such breach of contract itself, or as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.56
In contracts, damages are either “general” or “special” – the latter also are
referred to as “consequential.”57 Those damages addressed in Hadley which arise
naturally from the breach in the ordinary course of events are deemed general damages
and are foreseeable by definition.58 Special – or consequential – damages are those
referenced in the second prong of Hadley. Consequential damages are those unique to
the plaintiff’s particular circumstances and do not, automatically, in cases of plaintiff's
type, inevitably flow from the breach as foreseeable.59 For example, in Hadley, the
miller’s lost profits were denied as consequential damages because he had only the one
crankshaft and this fact, unique to plaintiff’s circumstances, was not known to defendant
at the time of contracting.60 As the court noted, Plaintiff could have had a spare
crankshaft.61 Lost profits were not inevitable in a case like Plaintiff’s, but instead were
due to Plaintiff’s unique circumstances which were unknown to the defendant at the time
of contracting. The Hadley Court noted: “For, had the special circumstances been
known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special
terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to
deprive them.”62 The test of foreseeability is an objective one; in other words, defendant
need not have actually contemplated the particular loss at the time of contracting, the loss
need only have been objectively foreseeable.63 Regarding emotional disturbance
damages caused by a breach, objective foreseeability may be established by showing “the
contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a

56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Optimal Interiors, LLC v. HON Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1011 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (equating special and
consequential damages); SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 841 F.3d 827, 838 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Desco
Corp. v. Harry W. Trushel Const. Co., 413 S.E.2d 85, 89–90 (W. Va. 1991) (same); Tate & Lyle Americas LLC v. Glatt
Air Techniques, Inc., No. 13-2037, 2016 WL 7422289, at *3 (C.D. Ill. May 20, 2016) (same); Bi-Econ. Mkt., Inc. v.
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 886 N.E.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. 2008) (same); Giampapa v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 64
P.3d 230, 237 n.3 (Colo. 2003) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. a (Law Inst. 1981)
(discussing general and special damages and noting the latter are synonymous with consequential damages).
58 HUNTER, supra note 54, at § 13:10, citing, Unilever United States Inc. v. Johnson Controls Inc., No. 16-CV-01849,
2017 WL 3311038, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (explaining that general damages are foreseeable by definition, whereas
consequential damages must be reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b (Law Inst. 1981); 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:16 Distinction between general and
special damages (May 2021 Update).
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b (Law Inst. 1981); see also HUNTER, supra note 54, at § 13:10.
60 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 E.R. 145 (1854).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Lawrence v. Will Darrah & Assocs., Inc., 516 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Mich. 1994) (noting that the inquiry into consequential
damages “which can reasonably be said to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made” is
an objective one); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that actual or subjective
knowledge of consequential serious emotional disturbance is not required; the test is an objective one); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. a (Law Inst. 1981) (noting that consequential losses that are
foreseeable include those “as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in
breach had reason to know” and stating that the test is an objective one); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353
(noting that recovery of damages for emotional disturbance will be permitted if “the breach is of such a kind that serious
emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”).
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particularly likely result.”64 For example, courts have awarded damages for emotional
disturbance in breach of contract cases involving innkeepers and guests,65 common
carriers and passengers,66 transportation or burial of a deceased person,67 and delivery or
non-delivery of messages involving concerning death.68 A breach of contract in these
situations is one where serious emotional disturbance is “particularly likely.” 69 Court
have continued to expand the above categories, finding emotional disturbance damages
were “particularly likely” in a myriad of other situations.70 Some courts have held that
emotional disturbance damages were “particularly likely” when the nature of the contract
was personal, rather than pecuniary, ruling that emotional disturbance damages are
objectively foreseeable at the time of contracting when the contract addresses matters of
mental concern, solicitude, and personal feelings.71 The latter approach has been used to
award consequential emotional disturbance damages for breach of service contracts
involving prenatal care and childbirth. 72 In those situations, the Courts recognize that,
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Law Inst. 1981); see also Menorah Chapels at Millburn v.
Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (ruling consequential damages for emotional disturbance are
available “where the subject-matter of the contract is such as to make it certain or reasonably probable that the parties had
in contemplation, at the time of the making of the contract, a pecuniary satisfaction for the anguish and distress of mind
ensuing from a breach of its terms”); Stanczyk v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 15-CV-0097-CJW, 2017 WL 11454717,
at *23 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 20, 2017) (recognizing consequential damages for emotional disturbance are permitted when the
“nature of the breach is particularly likely to cause serious emotional disturbance” but holding that breach of insurance
contract was not one where such damages were particularly likely.); Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk, 424 P.3d
897, 907 (Utah 2018) (holding consequential damages for emotional disturbance were not foreseeable from the nature of a
contract to provide legal representation because the contract did not involve peculiarly personal interests); Strader v. Union
Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (acknowledging reasonably foreseeable consequential damages for
emotional harm may be awarded for breach of an insurance contract).
65 See, e.g., Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 126 N.E. 647, 649 (N.Y. 1920); see also Pollock v. Holsa Corp., 98 A.2d
265, 267, (N.Y. 1984) (recognizing the exception but refusing to apply it to the facts before the court); R ESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981 & June 2021 Update); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 64:11, Damages for Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
66 See, e.g., Stone v. Cont'l Airlines, 804 N.Y.S.2d 652, 659 (Civ. Ct. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981 & June 2021 Update); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11, Damages for
Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
67 See, e.g., Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 324-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Lamm v.
Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813–14 (1949); Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Mont. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981 & June 2021 Update); see also 24 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 64:11, Damages for Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
68 Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 23 S.E.2d 681(N.C. 1943); Betts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83 S.E. 164,
165-66 (N.C. 1914); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981 & June 2021 Update); see
also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11, Damages for Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (Law Inst. 1981).
70 See, e.g., Chrum v. Charles Heating and Cooling, Inc., 327 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing a
variety of cases where the contract was held to involve mental concern and solicitude); see also 24 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 64:11 (4th ed. June 2021 Update)(discussing a variety of fact scenarios where courts have permitted breach
of contract emotional disturbance damages). Of course, damage awards for emotional disturbance are also available when
the breach is willful and wanton. 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11 (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
71 Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. 1949) (acknowledging that emotional disturbance damages are proper
when the contract involves matters of mental concern or solicitude); Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d
1173, 1201 (11th Cir. 2007)(same); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Mass. 1973) (same); Taylor v. Baptist
Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (same); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11, Damages for
Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
72 See, e.g., Taylor, 400 So. 2d 369. In Taylor, the plaintiff sued her physician and the hospital to recover for her physical
pain and mental anguish when her child was either stillborn or died within moments of birth. 400 So. 2d at 371. Although
Plaintiff’s physician asked her to go to the hospital when she experienced labor pains at 3:00 a.m., the physician did not
arrive at the hospital until approximately 11:40 a.m., ten minutes after plaintiff delivered. Id. Plaintiff’s child already was
dead when her physician arrived. Plaintiff was attended by two nurses during her delivery, without the assistance of her
physician. Id. Plaintiff sued her physician for breach of contract and sued both her physician and the hospital for negligence.
Of particular significance for purposes of this article is Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against her physician, Dr. Hassell.
Plaintiff claimed her physician breached his contract to provide her with prenatal, delivery, and postnatal care which caused
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although damages for mental anguish typically are not awarded in a breach of contract
action, an exception exists when due to the nature of the contract “the contractual duty or
obligation is so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the feelings
of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering . . . .”73 Although a breach of contract by
ART practitioners also involves matters of mental concern and solicitude, a service
contract, healthcare professionals, and procreative matters, courts remain reluctant to
award breach of contract damages for emotional disturbance when cryopreserved
reproductive material has been lost or destroyed.
A.
Breach of Contract Cases Addressing Emotional Disturbance
Damagesand Cryopreserved Reproductive Material
While there are many cases which address legal ownership and disposition of
stored reproductive material,74 it must be acknowledged that, at the time this article was
written, no cases have been published which provide a detailed discussion regarding the
availability of emotional disturbance consequential damages when reproductive material is
lost or destroyed. Several cases briefly address the availability of such damages and are
discussed below. The first two cases found emotional disturbance consequential damages
were unavailable based on the unique facts before the court. The third case permitted an
award of emotional disturbance damages; however, the court based its ruling on loss of
“irreplaceable property.”
1.

Robertson v. Saadat

One recent case involving lost reproductive material which addressed

her mental anguish. Id. at 369. The trial court granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Plaintiff
failed to offer any evidence linking her mental anguish to her physician’s failure to attend and that her distress, instead, was
caused by the loss of her child. Id. at 371. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim and permitted plaintiff’s claim for mental anguish arising from breach of contract. Id. at 374. For an extensive discussion
of cases involving emotional disturbance damages for breach of a service contract, see Gregory G. Sarno, J.D., Annotation,
Recovery of Compensatory Damages for Mental Anguish or Emotional Distress for Breach of Service Contract, 54 A.L.R.4th
901 (1987).
73 400 So. 2d at 374, quoting, Stead v. Blue Cross – Blue Shield of Alabama, 346 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1977). The Court
remanded and held that Plaintiff, upon sufficient proof, “may recover for mental anguish which may have resulted from the
breach of Dr. Hassell’s implied contract of care.” Id. at 375. In situations where the contract did not involve matters of
mental concern or solicitude, emotional distress damages typically will not be awarded. See, e.g., Brooks v. Hickman, 570
F. Supp. 619, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (stating breach of brokerage service contract resulting in loss of plaintiff’s “nest egg”
for retirement involved financial loss alone; therefore, emotional distress damages will not be permitted, even if the distress
was likely to result from the breach).
74 See, e.g., Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 988 (Conn. 2019) (discussing cryopreservation contract language regarding
disposition of embryos after divorce); Est. of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (enforcing
husband’s agreement with the company storing his frozen sperm that the sperm was to be destroyed upon his death);
Terrell v. Torres, 456 P.3d 13, 17 (Ariz. 2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020) (in divorce situation, “court was required to
enforce the parties’ chosen disposition of the embryos as set forth in the [cryopreservation] Agreement.”); J.B. v. M.B.,
783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (recognizing “persuasive reasons exist for enforcing pre-embryo disposition agreements”
after divorce); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete
donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes [after divorce] should generally be presumed valid and binding, and
enforced in any dispute between them.”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part, No. 34,
1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992)( “An agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos in the
event of contingencies [including divorce] . . . should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the
progenitors”); Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he best approach for resolving disputes
over the disposition of pre-embryos created with one party's sperm and another party's ova is to honor the parties' own
mutually expressed intent as set forth in their prior agreements.”); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. Ct. App.
2006) (enforcing embryo agreement that provides that the frozen embryos are to be discarded in the event of divorce.).
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consequential damages for emotional disturbance is Robertson v. Saadat.75 In Robertson,
a widow, Sarah Robertson, sued a tissue bank who lost her deceased husband’s sperm,
which she wished to use to conceive his child.76 She asserted several causes of action,
including one for breach of contract.77 Plaintiff’s claims were based on the “loss of her
ability to have a child biologically related to her deceased husband.” 78 In her claim for
breach of contract, Plaintiff argued that she was entitled to “recover emotional distress
damages resulting from a defendant’s breach of contract [because]the defendant ha[d]
reason to know that, by the nature of the subject matter of the contract, a breach would
result in mental suffering by the Plaintiff.”79 Plaintiff argued the foreseeability of emotional
harm was evident at the time of contracting based, in part, on the nature of the contract
itself, because the subject matter of the contract directly concerned the “comfort, happiness,
or personal welfare of one of the parties. . . .” 80 Plaintiff noted that courts have permitted
emotional distress damages for breach of “certain contracts which so affect the vital
concerns of the individual that severe mental distress is a foreseeable result of breach.”81
Plaintiff explained why her contract fell into the latter category:
[a]ny reasonable storage facility preserving a widow’s deceased husband’s
sperm would understand the widow would have hopes of having a future
child using her husband’s sperm. Therefore, any reasonable storage
facility in that position would foresee that, if the facility were to lose the
sperm, the widow suffering that lost hope to have that connection with her
deceased husband would suffer severe mental distress.82

Defendants filed a series of demurrers and motions to strike which ultimately led
to Plaintiff filing a fourth amended complaint.83 The trial court, noting that awards for
emotional disturbance are disfavored in breach of contract actions, was adamant that
Plaintiff not use breach of contract theory to recover for emotional disturbance. The trial
court, when sustaining the Defendants’ demurrers and granting the motions to strike,
75 Robertson v. Saadat, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
76 Id. at 218. Plaintiff’s husband, Aaron Robertson, had a potentially life-threatening genetic disease that could potentially
be transmitted to his offspring. Id. After Aaron suffered a stroke and was in a coma, Plaintiff requested that Aaron’s treating
physicians withdraw and store his sperm because the couple “always desired to have children together.” Id. Aaron’s condition
was terminal, and he died at age 29. Id. at 218-19. The medical center’s risk management department and ethics panel both
approved plaintiff’s request based upon cards and letters Aaron had written prior to his coma, in which he stated his desire to
have children with plaintiff. Id. at 218. Plaintiff wanted to store the sperm to achieve a later pregnancy after medical
technology advanced “to prevent Aaron from transmitting his genetic disease to their children.” Id. The Plaintiff signed a
written agreement with the medical center to freeze and store Aaron’s sperm. Id. at 219. The medical center was later sold to
Defendant Saadat, after Plaintiff’s original physician retired; the stored sperm was transferred to Saadat’s own facility. Id.
Years later, Plaintiff asked Saadat to transfer the six vials of stored sperm to UCLA medical center so that she could begin
her fertility treatment. Id. Ultimately, Plaintiff learned the sperm was lost; there was no sperm in storage from her deceased
husband. Id. at 219-20.
77 Id. at 220. In addition to breach of contract, Plaintiff sued for professional negligence, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, fraud, misrepresentation and/or concealment, loss of consortium, conversion,
breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and several alleged statutory violations. Id.
78 Id. at 218.
79 Id. at 233.
80 Id. at 233 (citing Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
81 Id. at 233-34 (quoting Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
82 Id. at 234.
83 Id. at 222-23.

112

expressly forbade Plaintiff from attempting to recover consequential damages for
emotional disturbance based on breach of contract:
[Plaintiff may file] one last amended Complaint specifying the damages
sought as being the loss of the bailment fees and costs (and attorney’s fees
if part of the bailment contract) and any other specific damages directly
from the alleged breach of contract, not to include anything like tort
damages, emotional distress, loss of fertility interests, etc. Any attempt to
resurrect or re-state or include the types of damages originally sought in
this case generally in the nature of consequential damages and/or loss will
result in a final dismissal of the Complaint.84
Plaintiff chose not to amend the Complaint and the trial court dismissed the case
with prejudice.85 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.86 However, in its opinion,
the Court of Appeals did not directly address plaintiff’s consequential damages argument
that her severe emotional distress was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of
contracting.87 Instead, the Court of Appeals side-stepped traditional consequential damages
analysis by ruling “plaintiff was not legally entitled to conceive a child posthumously with
Aaron’s sperm in the first place.”88 The case, nevertheless, illustrates courts’ continued
reluctance to abandon the traditional approach which denies recovery for emotional
disturbance damages in breach of contract actions. As the trial court noted, suchdamages
are “like tort damages.”89
2. Hardin v. Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates P.A.
Another recent case, Hardin v. Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates P.A.,90
denied Plaintiffs consequential damages for emotional disturbance when a
cryopreservation laboratory wrongfully released a client’s sperm to his ex-girlfriend, who

84 Robertson, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222-23.
85 Id. at 223.
86 Id. at 234.
87Although the court’s ruling avoided traditional consequential damages analysis and side-stepped Plaintiff’s arguments
that her severe emotional was foreseeable to defendants at the time of contracting, the court noted that such a claim might
succeed under different facts. In a footnote, the court stated: “We express no opinion regarding the donor’s respective
rights if the gametic tissue at issue was the product of two donors, such as a pre-embryo.” Id. at 228 n.12. Although the
court made the latter statement in reference to Plaintiff’s tort claim, it undoubtedly also has importance to her contract
claim. The court noted that her contract claim failed for the same reason as her tort claim; namely, she was not entitled to
extract and use her husband’s sperm. If, however, his sperm was used to fertilize her egg and a stored embryo was lost,
then the court would have been forced to address her claim for consequential damages. The court would have been unable
to rule, as they did, that she had no entitlement to the lost reproductive material or its use.
88 Id.at 234. The appellate court held that, under California law, the donor’s intent at the time of death was controlling
regarding stored gametic material. Id. at 223. According to the court, the facts alleged in the amended Complaint showed
Aaron did not consent to the extraction of his sperm or its use to conceive a child after his death; in fact, he was unaware of
the extraction and storage of his sperm. Id. As a result, the Court ruled Plaintiff was not entitled to have a child with
Aaron’s sperm. Id. at 234. The Court therefore concluded: “[P]laintiff fails to explain how she is entitled to damages for
emotional distress based on the loss of an opportunity she never had.” Id.
89 Id. at 222-23. But see Hardin v. Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates P.A., 527 S.W.3d 424, 444-45 (Tex. Ct. App.
2017)(denying emotional disturbance damages for breach of a cryopreservation contract which resulted in the birth of a
healthy child but ruling that such awards may be possible under different facts).
90 Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 444-45 (denying emotional disturbance damages for breach of a cryopreservation contract which
resulted in the birth of a healthy child but ruling that such awards may be possible under different facts).
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then used the sperm to conceive a healthy child without the client’s knowledge or consent.91
Although the case is not typical because the storage lab’s breach of contract resulted in the
birth of a healthy child, the case nevertheless is important because the court acknowledged
that emotional disturbance damages for breach of contract, while not proper on the facts of
the case before the court, may be proper under a different set of facts.
Prior to having a vasectomy, Layne Hardin had his sperm cryogenically stored at
the defendant’s laboratory.92 A contract was signed between the laboratory, Hardin, and
his domestic partner, Katherine LeBlanc, which stated LeBlanc had control over the stored
sperm, even if the couple’s relationship ended.93 Several years after Hardin’s relationship
with LeBlanc ended, he began to date Tobie Devall, and he told her about his stored
sperm.94 Hardin took Devall to the lab to discuss her ability to conceive.95 However, Hardin
and Devall later ended their relationship.96 Without Hardin or LeBlanc’s knowledge and
consent, Devall had Hardin’s sperm thawed and used to inseminate her, resulting in the
birth of a healthy boy.97
One of the causes of action asserted by both Hardin and LeBlanc was against the
lab for breach of contract.98 Hardin claimed the events were a “nightmare” that would last
“forever.” 99 A jury awarded two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) each, to both
Hardin and Leblanc, for mental anguish caused by the lab’s breach of contract.100 However,
in response to Defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court
overturned the awards, ruling that mental anguish damages cannot be awarded for the birth
of a healthy child as a matter of public policy.101 Instead, the court simply awarded Hardin
and Leblanc one thousand nine hundred fifty dollars ($1,950) for the loss of the two vials
of sperm as their breach of contract damages.102Although Hardin had a vasectomy after the
sperm was stored and both he and LeBlanc claimed their distresswas only for the taking of
the sperm and not the birth of a healthy child, the trial court rejected their argument.
Amazingly, the trial court stated: “[T]he Court suspects that had Devall taken the sperm
and thrown it in the trash . . .this case would not have been filed. .
. . The Court rejects Plaintiff[s’] argument that the mental anguish damages found were
unrelated to the ‘wrongful pregnancy.”103 Hardin and LeBlanc appealed. 104
One of the issues the appellate court addressed was whether Texas law permitted
91 Id. at 427-28.
92 Id. at 427.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 427.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 428. Hardin and LeBlanc also sued Devall for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. LeBlanc also sued
Devall for conversion. Id.
99 Id. at 427.
100 Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 432-33.
101 Id. at 433.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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Hardin and LeBlanc to recover damages for emotional disturbance based on their breach
of contract claim against the lab.105 Both Hardin and LeBlanc argued that emotional
disturbance damages should be recoverable for breach of contract in their case because
their special relationship with the lab “touche[d] on familial sensitivities.” 106 Therefore,
Plaintiffs argued their situation was analogous to plaintiffs in other cases of familial
sensitivity where courts have permitted recovery of emotional distress damages for breach
of contract, such as cases involving the mishandling of a corpse.107 However, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which denied
the award of emotional disturbance damages against the lab for breach of contract.108 The
appellate court, however, left the door open to such awards in other cases where the breach
did not result in the birth of a healthy child:
Contracting with an entity to store one’s own gametic material for future
use arguably could create a special relationship analogous to contracting
to properly handle a family member’s deceased body. But we need not
decide that issue because, even if it does, Hardin’s alleged mental anguish
that arose from the use of his gametic material was linked to its successful
use to create life, thus directly implicating the same public policies
discussed above. . .[W]e decline to extend the holding in the corpsemishandling and illness-notification cases to this case because [of those] .
. .public policy concerns. 109
Although the appellate court denied recovery of consequential damages for
emotional disturbance, the court limited its holding to the situations where the breach led
to the birth of a healthy child. The court noted: “[W]e do not hold that a special relationship
can never be created in the context of a contract to store gametic material or there can never
be recovery of mental anguish for breach of such a contract. Other fact patterns may create
a special relationship and may implicate public policy concerns that do not align with those
raised under these facts, in which a healthy child was born.” 110 Thus, although the court
left the door open regarding recovery of consequential damages for emotional disturbance,
the court avoided Plaintiffs’ arguments that such an award was justified by the familial
sensitivity and highly personal nature of the storage contract. Again, the holding, based on
the public policy of denying emotional distress recovery related to the birth of a healthy
child, allowed the court to avoid addressing the difficult question of whether Plaintiffs’
emotional distress damages were foreseeable by the storage laboratory at the time of
contracting.
Several other cases have permitted breach of contract claims to move forward
when reproductive material was lost or destroyed. However, the courts’ opinions in these
cases, while they may permit recovery for general breach of contract damages, do not
105 Id. at 428.
106 Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 444.
107
Id.
108 Id. at 444-45.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 445. But see Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.D.2d 231, 231 (2001) (in a tort action, denying defendants' motion
to dismiss which argued Plaintiffs’ sought to recover for emotional harm caused by the creation of human life and held
plaintiffs case could proceed to obtain “damages for the emotional harm caused by their having been deprived of the
opportunity of experiencing pregnancy, prenatal bonding and the birth of their child. ...... ”).
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expressly address or endorse recovery of consequential damages for emotional
disturbance.111 One trial court opinion, however, has discussed and endorsed breach of
contract emotional disturbance damages when reproductive material was lost or destroyed:
Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island.112
3. Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island
In Frisina, the Rhode Island Superior Court consolidated three separate couples’ lawsuits
against a hospital’s in vitro fertilization clinic when the couple’s embryos were lost or
destroyed, and the defendant clinic moved for summary judgment.113 Plaintiffs based their
claims on several legal theories, including breach of contract.114 In each of their claims,
including their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs also sought relief for “severe trauma and
emotional anguish, pain and suffering.”115 Defendant Women and Infant’s Hospital of
Rhode Island moved for summary judgment.116
Regarding the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, Defendant Hospital argued the wellestablished traditional rule that Plaintiffs may not recover emotional disturbance damages
based on breach of contract.117 Defendant Hospital also contended that Plaintiffs did not
suffer a compensable loss because Plaintiffs really sought emotional disturbance damages
based on their lost opportunity to achieve pregnancy, which was never guaranteed by the
hospital.118 Defendant also noted that Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 353 was
not adopted in Rhode Island and, assuming for argument’s sake the court chose to follow
section 353, that section would not apply to the plaintiffs’ situation because plaintiffs
suffered no bodily harm and emotional harm was not a “particularly likely” result of the
111 See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (parents stated a cause of action for breach of bailment
contract and detinue when seeking possession of cryopreserved human pre-zygote); Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d
1256 (Ariz. 2005) (explaining breach of bailment contract survives motion to dismiss when clinic loses five frozen preembryos); see also Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 371 (2007)(breach of contract action seeking to recover for
mental anguish was dismissed without opposition after plaintiff sued clinic, physicians, and other personnel when
defendants did not use sperm from her husband to fertilize plaintiff’s eggs.).
112 Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, Nos. CIV.A.95-4037, CIV.A. 95-4469, CIV.A.95-5827, 2002
WL 1288784, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002). Although Frisina is an unpublished opinion, the opinion includes a
comprehensive discussion of the legal obstacles confronting courts and aspiring parents when reproductive material is lost
or destroyed. In addition, the case is often cited by legal scholars who acknowledge its importance. At the time of this
article’s submission, Frisina was cited in at least twenty-seven scholarly articles. See, e.g., Hnylka, Traditional Barriers,
supra note 12, at 350-51; Dawn R. Swink, J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product
Liability Online, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 857, 890 n.162 (2007); Fox, Reproductive Negligence, supra note 20, at 172; J. Brad
Reich and Dawn Swink, You Can't Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the
Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 66 n.340 (2010); McBride, Eggs Frozen, supra note 12, at 774.
113 2002 WL 1288784, at *1. Plaintiffs David and Carol Frisina, the first couple, cryopreserved nine embryos at the clinic
to achieve pregnancy at a later date. Id. The clinic later informed them that only three of the nine were “available”, and that
none of those three embryos were “suitable for transfer” to her uterus. Id. The second couple, Plaintiffs Robert and Vickie
Lamontagne, successfully gave birth to a baby girl after using three of seven fertilized eggs they stored at the clinic. Id.
However, the clinic admitted it “lost” the couple’s four remaining embryos. Id. The third couple, George and Susan Doyle,
successfully used IVF to give birth to a healthy baby girl at the clinic. Id. at *2. However, when the couple later returned
to have another child using the five remaining stored embryos, they were told the clinic “inadvertently destroyed” the
embryos when the clinic relocated. Id.
114 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *2. Plaintiffs’ claims included medical malpractice, bailment, loss of irreplaceable
property, and breach of contract. Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at *1.
117 Id. at *9.
118 Id. Defendant also noted there was an 80% chance that pregnancy would not result and damages would be difficult to
assess. Id.
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breach.119 Regarding the latter point, defendant pointed out the plaintiffs’ breach of contract
claim did not involve any of the traditional exceptions where the Restatement recognized
emotional disturbance was “particularly likely”, such as breaches involving common
carriers, the mishandling of a corpse, or the delivery of a message concerning death.120
Plaintiffs, however, argued the hospital’s breach was analogous to the mishandling of a
corpse and did result in the same type of severe emotional disturbance:
The IVF experience is physically taxing for the prospective mother and
emotionally draining for both prospective parents. Clinics report that
couples attempting IVF often show an abnormal attachment to the
embryos, sometimes even naming them, and experience deep depression
if successful implantation does not occur.121
The trial court denied Defendant Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Rejecting the Hospital’s argument that no promise of
pregnancy was ever made and therefore plaintiffs suffered no loss, the trial court stated:
“This court finds that the plaintiffs are seeking to recover for the physical loss of their preembryos rather than for the loss of the possibility of achieving pregnancy as claimed by the
defendant.”122 Although the court acknowledged Rhode Island did not typically permit
awards for emotional disturbance based on breach of contract, the court ruled such awards
are permitted for the “loss of irreplaceable property” and held emotional disturbance
damages for “the loss of [Plaintiffs’] pre-embryos [] is permissible under the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s holding in Hawkins v. Scituate Oil. . . .” 123 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ breach
of contract claim seeking emotional distress damages was permitted to proceed to trial.
Although the Frisina court’s decision to permit recovery of emotional disturbance damages
for breach of contract is admirable, the court’s decision to base recovery of emotional
disturbance damages on the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision in Hawkins v. Scituate
Oil124 is puzzling. Hawkins provides little support for the Frisina court’s ruling. In fact,
Hawkins was a tort claim involving damage to real property.125 In Hawkins, homeowners
sued an oil company for negligence which rendered their home uninhabitable after the oil
company negligently pumped heating oil into an incorrect pipe, flooding the homeowner’s
basement.126 The case was one of nuisance involving real property where the Court applied
the traditional measure of damages for harm to real property, which includes compensation
for the property owner’s mental anguish, discomfort, and annoyance.127 The Frisina court
119 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *10.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What about Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1993)).
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing Hawkins v. Scituate Oil, 723 A.2d 771 (R.I. 1999)).
124 Id. (citing Hawkins, 723 A.2d 771 (R.I. 1999)). While the court expressly stated breach of contract emotional distress
damages were permissible under Hawkins, the court also noted Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass’n, 68 A. 721 (R.I.
1908), provided some additional support “suggesting that such damages [for emotional distress] might be available in
certain factual scenarios.” Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *10.
125 Hawkins, 723 A.2d at 771. The Hawkins Court summarized the legal issue in that case as follows: “When a tortfeasor's
negligence deprives a family of the use and enjoyment of their home, is the family entitled to recover damages for their
resulting inconvenience, discomfort, and annoyance?” Id.
126
Id.
127 Id. at 772.
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should have recognized that Hawkins was limited to real property harm and did not involve
emotional disturbance damages for breach of contract.128
The Frisina Court’s decision to describe the breach of contract loss as one of “irreplaceable
property” also creates confusion. Embryos are not typical “irreplaceable property” such as
family photographs,129 nor would the loss of embryos necessarily cause severe emotional
disturbance in every individual plaintiff.130 Although the vast majority of individuals
cryogenically store reproductive material to achieve pregnancy and give birth to their own
biological children,131 not every person who stores reproductive material stores the material
in the hope of someday using that material to have their own biological child. Some people
store reproductive material for use in scientific research.132 Others store it for medical
reasons unrelated to achieving pregnancy.133 Yet others store reproductive material to be
donated for another’s use.134 Arguably, not all of these individuals would experience
emotional disturbance when they learn of their reproductive material’s loss or destruction
and, even if some would experience emotional disturbance, the disturbance most likely
would not be at the same level as that experienced by aspiring parents when the breach
destroyed their only opportunity to give birth to their own biological children. Similarly,
128 In language noted but apparently ignored by the Frisina Court, the Hawkins decision limited its holding to real property
cases:
The necessity for proving some interference with or deprivation of a possessory interest in the
property in question as a condition precedent to obtaining damages for any resulting inconvenience,
discomfort, or annoyance distinguishes this type of case from those alleging a mere intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress ....... In sum, in cases like this one involving a physical
interference with or a loss of a possessory interest in real property, the prevention of trumped-up or
specious-damage demands for alleged intangible personal injuries is of less an evidentiary concern
than it is in the context of cases alleging a mere intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
Hawkins, 723 A.2d at 773, quoted in part by Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9.
129 Courts have addressed the legal status of a stored embryo and disagree whether a stored embryo should be treated as a
person, as property, or as “something in-between” deserving “special respect.” See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594
(acknowledging the legal quandary of whether an stored embryo is a “person” or “property” and holding pre-embryos
“occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect.”); see also Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *4-5 (ruling
that cryopreserved pre-embryos cannot be classified as victims); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (concluding “that pre-embryos
are not, strictly speaking, either “persons” or “property,” but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.”); York, 717 F. Supp. at 427 (ruling that plaintiffs cryopreserved prezygote created a property interest); Kurchener v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that destruction of sperm constitutes property damage in Florida.).
130 See, e.g., Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 433 (noting plaintiff’s emotional distress was not caused by the loss of his stored
sperm and stating the suit likely would not have been filed if defendant had thrown the sperm in the trash.).
131 Hoffman & Zellman, Cryopreserved Embryos, supra note 28, at 1068 (noting that 88.2% of stored embryos are used
by patients to achieve pregnancy). ASRM survey results indicate that less than three percent of cryopreserved embryos are
stored for research purposes, and less than one percent are stored for use in quality assurance activities. Id.
132 See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic, Embryo Cryopreservation: Why is Embryo cryopreservation Done?,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/treatments/15464-embryo-cryopreservation (noting embryos may be cryopreserved
for use in scientific research) (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
133 See, e.g., Hoffman & Zellman, Cryopreserved Embryos, supra note 28, at 1063 (noting that cryopreserved embryos are
a source for stem cells “that might be used to grow replacement tissues for people suffering from cancer, Alzheimer’s
disease, diabetes, and other diseases.”).
134 Cleveland Clinic, Embryo Cryopreservation: Why is Embryo cryopreservation Done,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/treatments/15464-embryo-cryopreservation (discussing donation of cryopreserved
embryos) (last visited Aug. 5, 2021); Midwest Fertility, Why Freeze your Eggs?,
https://www.midwestfertility.com/fertility-treatments/cryopreservation-of-eggs/ (same) (last visited Aug. 5, 2021); ASRM
Reproductive Facts, FAQs About Fertility, What are my Options if I Decide Not to use my Stored Embryos?,
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/faqs/frequently-asked-questions-about-infertility/q11-what-are-my-options-if-i-decidenot-to-use-my-stored-embryos/ (same) (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
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although some aspiring parents may become infertile after storing their reproductive
material due to age or illness, other aspiring parents whose reproductive material is lost or
destroyed may still retain the ability to have their own biological children; arguably, their
reaction to the loss would be less severe than aspiring parents who have lost their only
chance to have their own biological children. As a result, the emotional disturbance caused
by the breach, if any, varies widely amongst those whose stored reproductive material was
lost or destroyed. 135 In other words, severe emotional disturbance will not automatically
result from the breach in every case where reproductive material is lost or destroyed.
Instead, emotional disturbance, if any, will be linked to plaintiff’s unique circumstances,
and the disturbance is particularly likely to occur and be most severe when aspiring parents
lose their ability to achieve pregnancy and give birth to their own biological child. 136
Therefore, if aspiring parents are to recover breach of contract damages for emotional
disturbance when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed, those damages most
likely will be consequential damages based on the aspiring parents’ unique circumstances.
Although any breach of contract may cause some emotional disturbance, not every breach
resulting in the loss or destruction of reproductive material is, inevitably, as a matter of
course, “of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance [is] a particularly likelyresult.”137
The availability of damages for emotional harm will have to be examined on a case-bycase basis.
B.
Several Helpful Tort Cases that Address Foreseeability of Emotional
Disturbance when Cryopreserved Reproductive Material is Lost or Destroyed.
Although no breach of contract case involving lost or destroyed reproductive material has
contained in-depth analysis of the availability of consequential damages for emotional
disturbance,
several cases addressing tort claims for negligent and/or intentional
infliction of emotional disturbance have found that emotional disturbance is foreseeable
when reproductive material is lost or destroyed.138 These cases are from jurisdictions that
do not impose the traditional barriers139 to recovery for stand-alone emotional harm.
Therefore, in these jurisdictions, aspiring parents were permitted to recover for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”) using a traditional negligence approach in which
foreseeability of emotional harm was crucial to establishing defendants’ duty.140 Although
the inquiry regarding foreseeability of harm in tort is not identical to the inquiry regarding

135 See Fox, Intangible Losses, supra note 9, at 461(“Permanent deprivations will tend to cause more acute harms than
temporary reproductive setbacks.”).
136 See Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779, 788 (Super. Ct. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs’ emotional distress is
due to “the loss of an opportunity to potentially become pregnant, and thereby experience pregnancy, prenatal bonding and
the birth of a child. As in Perry–Rogers and in Del Zio, it is the loss of the opportunity potentially to
become pregnant rather than the loss of an actual fetus that caused the emotional distress.”). Courts have reached analogous
conclusions in wrongful birth cases, noting that the harm “is not the birth of the child, but the parents lost opportunity to
decide for themselves whether to continue the pregnancy.” Lodato ex rel. Lodato v. Kappy, 803 A.2d 160, 166 (N.J.Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002) (citing McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 771 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 2001).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (Law Inst. 1981); see also HUNTER, supra note 52, at § 13:10
(discussing the distinction between general and special damages under Hadley v. Baxendale).
138 Witt, 977 A.2d at 785-86 (addressing foreseeability of emotional harm); Perry-Rogers, 282 A.D.2d at 231-32 (same).
139 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
140 Witt, 977 A.2d at 784-85 (noting foreseeability is the primary focus); Perry-Rogers, 282 A.D.2d at 231-32
(acknowledging breach of duty causing emotional harm is required, and ruling that harm was foreseeable); see also Del Zio
v. Presbyterian Hosp. in New York, No 74 Civ. 3588 (CES), 1978 U.S. Dist. Lexis14450 at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1978)
(holding the defendants’ intentional conduct “predictably caused severe emotional distress.”).
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foreseeability of consequential damages in a breach of contract action,141 these cases,
nevertheless, contain useful analysis that could help inform the inquiry regarding whether
a defendant could foresee at the time of contracting that emotional disturbance was
“particularly likely” when a breach results in the loss or destruction of stored reproductive
material.
1.

Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hospital142

In Witt, a couple sued a hospital fertility center for negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional disturbance when the facility discarded Plaintiff Carolyn Witt’s cryogenically
stored ovarian tissue.143 The couple, who had no children, claimed they suffered emotional
disturbance because they “lost [the] opportunity to potentially conceive a child together.”144
After preserving her reproductive material, Plaintiff Carolyn Witt was rendered infertile
due to chemotherapy.145 She asserted that, at the time the hospital agreed to store her
reproductive material, they did so “with the full knowledge that the frozen ovarian tissue
it had harvested and stored was their [her and her husband’s] only hope of one day
conceiving a child together.”146 The hospital filed a motion to strike the claims for negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.147 The Connecticut Superior Court allowed
the claims for intentional and negligent emotional distress to proceed, striking only the
husband’s count for intentional infliction of emotional distress.148 In its opinion, the Witt
court addressed the foreseeability of Plaintiffs’ emotional harm to the defendant hospital
and analogized the relationship between ART practitioners and their patients to the
relationship between immediate family members and a mortician:
[T]he court views the relationship between parents and ART practitioners
to be analogous to the relationship shared by immediate family members
and a mortician. In both cases, there is an important dignity interest shared
by families: caring for human remains in a respectful manner in the case
of a relative's corpse and preserving the potential for human reproduction
in the case of a spouse's ovarian tissue. Moreover, the relationship that a
mortician has with the immediate family members of the decedent is akin
to the relationship that a fertility physician has with both parents: both
relationships involve a class of related people who are particularly
vulnerable emotionally and are heavily dependent on the practitioner's
diligence. Most importantly, though, in both situations the practitioner's
duty to the immediate family is predicated on the
141 For a general discussion of the differences, see HUNTER, supra note 54, at § 13:9 (noting that in a contract action,
unlike a tort, “there must be a more direct connection between the damage and the risks actually assumed by the parties
when they entered into the agreement.”); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:17 (4th ed. June 2021 Update) (“For
a tort, the defendant becomes liable for all proximate consequences, while for breach of contract the defendant is liable
only for consequences that were reasonably foreseeable, at the time the contract was made, as likely to result if the contract
were broken”.).
142 977 A.2d at 781..
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 782.
146 Id. at 785.
147

Id. at 782.
148 Id.
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family's shared reliance on the practitioner's professional performance to
ensure the desired result. Just as a mother and father would be equally
distressed to learn that their deceased child was cremated despite their
instructions to the mortician to embalm the child for an open casket wake,
so, too, would the same parents be equally distressed to learn that their
only hope for having a child together was discarded by their medical
provider.149
In Witt, the court noted that foreseeability to the defendant of serious emotional harm was
a primary focus.150 The Witt court noted that serious emotional harm was objectively
foreseeable to the ART practitioners in the event of breach of duty: “[T]he anxiety the
plaintiffs experienced as a result of the lost ovarian tissue was so predictably severe that
the defendant should have known it could reasonably lead to illness or physical injury.”151
2.

Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju152

In Perry-Rogers, the foreseeability of serious emotional distress caused by an ART
practitioner’s breach of duty was addressed after ART practitioners mistakenly implanted
plaintiffs’ embryo in an unidentified third party who became pregnant.153 Plaintiffs filed an
action for malpractice and sought to recover damages for emotional harm154 because they
could no longer use their embryo to “experience pregnancy, prenatal bonding, and birth of
their child.”155 The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss; the appellate division
of the New York Supreme Court affirmed and held plaintiffs’ claim could proceed, based
upon the foreseeable risk of serious emotional harm caused by the ART practitioner’s
breach of duty:
Here, it was foreseeable that the information that defendants had
mistakenly implanted plaintiffs’ embryos in a person whom they would
not identify, which information was not conveyed until after such person
had become pregnant, would cause plaintiffs emotional distress over the
possibility that the child they wanted so desperately, as evidenced by their
undertaking the rigors of in vitro fertilization , might be born to someone
else and that they might never know his or her fate.156
149 Id. at 789–90; see also Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 444-45 (“Contracting with an entity to store one’s own gametic material
for future use arguably could create a special relationship analogous to contracting to properly handle a family member’s
deceased body. But we need not decide that issue ...... ”).
150 977 A.2d at 785 (“As a threshold matter, the court must now resolve the question as to whether the anxiety or fear
attendant upon the loss of an opportunity. .... to potentially conceive a child is sufficiently foreseeable to support a claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.”) The court based its conclusion on the foreseeability to defendants of plaintiff’s
serious emotional harm. Id. at 784 (“the primary focus for a court is on the question of foreseeability........ ”).
151 Id. at 788; see also Del Zio, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 at *1, *14 (acknowledging the “substantial certainty” that
the destruction of plaintiffs’ fertilized ova would cause severe emotional distress).
152 282 A.D.2d 231 (2001).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 232; see also Del Zio, 1978 U.S. Dist. Lexis14450 at *14 (upholding plaintiffs’ jury verdict for intentional
infliction of emotional distress when hospital intentionally destroyed plaintiffs’ fertilized ova without their knowledge
“which predictably caused severe emotional distress.”). However, the court noted plaintiffs must produce evidence
“sufficient to guarantee the genuineness of the claim.” Perry-Rogers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 28, 282 A.D.2d at 232.
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Although no cases have been published which provide a detailed discussion regarding the
availability of emotional disturbance consequential damages when reproductive material is
lost or destroyed, the above cases help inform the inquiry regarding whether such damages
are foreseeable at the time of contracting. As will be explained below, traditional
consequential damages analysis rooted in Hadley v. Baxendale supports aspiring parents’
recovery of emotional disturbance damages for breach of contract when their stored
reproductive material is lost or destroyed. The consequential damages analysis, however,
must focus on what was known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of
contracting. Just as the court in Hadley v. Baxendale denied the miller’s lost profits as
consequential damages because the miller never told the Defendant at the time of
contracting that he had only one crankshaft and would be forced to remain closed during
repairs, 157 the inquiry in lost or destroyed reproductive materials cases also must focus on
what the storage facility knew, or what was reasonably foreseeable to them, at the time of
contracting.

IV.

FORESEEABILITY OF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
BREACH OF A CRYOPRESERVATION CONTRACT

When reproductive material was stored for the purpose of achieving a later pregnancy,158
a defendant’s breach of contract which results in the loss or destruction of the reproductive
material should support an award of consequential damages for emotional disturbance. This
is particularly true when, due to plaintiffs’ age or illness, the loss realistically destroys
plaintiffs’ opportunity to have their own biological child. Although, as will be discussed
later in this article, contractual language plays a key role when determining defendant’s
liability for damages, when the court examines whether consequential emotional
disturbance damages can reasonably be said to have been in contemplation of the parties
at the time the storage contract was made, courts are free to examine the nature of the
underlying transaction, the purpose of the contract, and the surrounding circumstances to
aid in the determination of whether consequential damages are foreseeable at the time of
contracting, especially when the contract is silent regarding a particular risk of loss.159 The

157 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 E.R. 145 (1854).
158 As discussed supra, Part III.A.3, not every individual stores reproductive material to achieve a later pregnancy. Some
individuals store reproductive material for use in research, etc. As a result, the emotional disturbance caused by the
reproductive material’s loss will vary and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. However, for couples, who use the
cryopreservation process to become parents of their own biological child, the loss of the stored reproductive material
typically results in severe emotional distress, as will be explained infra, Part IV.A.
159 Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2000) (courts consider “the nature, purpose and particular
circumstances of the contract known by the parties.”); Kenford Co. v. Cty. of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 179 (N.Y. 1989) (“In
determining the reasonable contemplation of the parties, the nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract
known by the parties should be considered.”); Lawrence v. Will Darrah & Assocs., Inc., 516 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (Mich.
1994) (using a “flexible approach” that examines the nature of the underlying transaction, the purpose of the agreement,
and the surrounding circumstances); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:17 (May 2021 Update)(acknowledging
courts use a flexible approach when determining whether consequential damages were foreseeable, taking into account the
nature of the underlying transaction, the purpose of the contract, and surrounding circumstances); C ALAMARI & PERILLO,
CONTRACTS (3d ed.), § 14–7, p. 599 (“Courts must be aware of the transactional context in which the transactions occur.”);
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1002, p. 33 (noting that breach of contract damages rules are “very flexible” and stating that
courts must consider “the special circumstances of the particular case”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351
cmt. b (Law Inst. 1981) (“The parol evidence rule (§ 213) does not, however, preclude the use of negotiations prior to the
making of the contract to show for this purpose [foreseeability of consequential damages] circumstances that were then
known to a party.”).
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Hadley standard of foreseeability is an objective one.160 In the overwhelming majority of
breach of contract cases involving the loss or destruction of reproductive material stored to
achieve a later pregnancy, the nature of the transaction, the purpose of the contract, and the
surrounding circumstances put defendants on notice at the time of contracting that serious
emotional disturbance was “particularly likely” to result from a breach. Finally, aspiring
parents should be able to demonstrate with certainty that damages were caused by the
breach.
A.
Foreseeability of Emotional Disturbance Damages Based on the
Nature of the ART Process.
The nature of the transaction supports consequential damages for emotional disturbance.
At the time ART clinics contract to store aspiring parents’ reproductive material for later
use to achieve a pregnancy, it is foreseeable to the ART clinic and its employees that the
aspiring parents will suffer emotional disturbance if the reproductive materials are lostor
destroyed, eliminating the aspiring parents’ opportunity to use those stored materials to
have a child. This foreseeability, in part, is based on the nature of the underlying
transaction, which is personal rather than commercial and involves matters of mental
concern, solicitude, and high emotions.161 Aspiring parents hire ART professionals to store
their reproductive material to achieve pregnancy at a later date. Aspiring parents rely on
ART professional’s skill and professional performance to see that their reproductive
materials are stored safely and are not harmed, lost, or destroyed. ART professionals
acknowledge that the IVF process, including cryopreservation of reproductive material, is
wrought with high emotions and likely to produce great emotional upset if the process
fails.162 The ART process has been described as “emotionally draining for both prospective
parents.”163 These facts are known to ART professionals at the time of contracting or, at
minimum, should be known. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s Guide
160 Lawrence, 516 N.W.2d at 48 (noting that the inquiry into consequential damages “which can reasonably be said to
have been in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made” is an objective one); see also Huskey v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that actual or subjective knowledge of consequential serious
emotional disturbance is not required; the test is an objective one); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351
cmt. a (Law Inst. 1981) (noting that consequential losses that are foreseeable include those “as a result of special
circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know” and stating that the test
is an objective one); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (noting that recovery of damages for emotional
disturbance will be permitted if “the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely
result.”).
161 See, e.g., Lamm, 55 S.E.2d at 813 (acknowledging that emotional disturbance damages are proper when the contract
involves matters of mental concern or solicitude); Sheely, 505 F.3d at 1200-01 (same); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d
183, 189 (Mass. 1973)(same); Taylor, 400 So. 2d at 374 (same); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:11, Damages
for Mental Suffering (4th ed. June 2021 Update).
162 See, e.g., Witt, 977 A.2d at 788 (noting severe emotional stress that typically accompanies ART procedures); PerryRogers, 282 A.D.2d at 231-32 (stating plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress when they were “deprived of the
opportunity of experiencing pregnancy, prenatal bonding and the birth of their child. ......”); Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents,
and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Arts, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 76 (2003)
(noting that when ART practitioners err “the emotional distress is unimaginable.”); Alise R. Panitch, The Davis Dilemma:
How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 573 (1991) (“Any spouse ultimately
denied the chance to have a child through IVF would probably suffer considerable emotional stress.”); Hnylka, Traditional
Barriers, supra note 12, at 362-63 (discussing the emotional stress aspiring parents experience when problems occur in
ART).
163 Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1993); see also Supriya
Kakkar, Unauthorized Embryo Transfer at the University of California, Irvine Center for Reproductive Health, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1020 (1997) (same); Hnylka, Traditional Barriers, supra note 12, at 362-63 (same); Suchitra
Jittaun Satpathi, Gliding over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Responsibility in the New Reproductive Era; Why
Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 58 (1999) (same).
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for Patients openly acknowledges that the nature of ART poses a risk of serious emotional
harm:
Assisted reproductive technologies involve significant physical, financial,
and emotional commitments on the part of the couple. Psychological stress
is common, and some couples describe the experience as an emotional
roller coaster. The treatments are involved and costly. Patients have high
expectations, yet failure is common in any given cycle. Couples may feel
frustrated, angry, isolated, and resentful. At times, frustration can lead to
depression and feelings of low self-esteem, especially in the immediate
period following a failed ART attempt. The support of friends and family
members is very important at this time. Couples are encouraged to
consider psychological counseling as an additional means of support and
stress management. Many ART programs have a mental health
professional on staff to help couples deal with the grief, tension, or
anxieties associated with infertility and its treatment.164
If the ART process is already known to be an “emotional roller coaster” and a failed ART
attempt is known to cause severe emotional disturbance, then it logically follows that the
loss or destruction of aspiring parents’ reproductive material also is particularly likely to
cause severe emotional disturbance. The nature of the ART process puts the clinic and ART
practitioners on notice at the time of contracting that a breach resulting in the materials loss
or destruction is particularly likely to cause aspiring parents severe emotionaldisturbance.
B.
Foreseeability of Emotional Disturbance Damages Based on the
Purpose of the Cryopreservation Agreement and the Surrounding
Circumstances.
The purpose of the cryopreservation contract and the surrounding circumstances also make
the particular likelihood a breach will cause severe emotional disturbance known, or
objectively foreseeable, by ART clinics and practitioners at the time of contracting for
several reasons: First, most cryopreserved reproductive material is stored at clinics
specializing in fertility assistance.165 Many, if not most, fertility clinics advertisements taut
the use of cryopreservation as a method to secure a future pregnancy. As one clinic noted
in its online webpage: “Cryopreservation allows for peace of mind about a future
family.”166 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has reported that
“virtually all” cryopreserved embryos are stored at clinics rather than being stored offsite.167 As a result, these storage facilities have either actual or, at minimum, constructive
knowledge of the reason for storage: namely, to achieve a pregnancy at a later date. A
recent survey of clinics by ASRM noted that “most clinics were able to tell us why embryos
were in storage”168 which indicates that most clinics had actual knowledge of intended use
164 Guide for Patients, supra note 23, at 17; see also Hnylka, Traditional Barriers, supra note 12, at 362-63 (same).
165 Hoffman & Zellman, Cryopreserved Embryos, supra note 28, at 1066 (“Virtually all embryos are stored at clinic
facilities”).
166 Loma Linda University, Center for Fertility and IVF, Cryopreservation: Benefits of Cryopreservation,
https://lomalindafertility.com/treatments/cryopreservation/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
167 Hoffman & Zellman, Cryopreserved Embryos, supra note 28, at 1066 (survey results indicate that less than two
percent of cryopreserved embryos are stored off-site).
168
Id.
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of the cryopreserved reproductive material stored at their clinic. Also, in the majority of
cases where reproductive material is stored, the purpose for its storage is to achieve a later
pregnancy. The primary reason for cryopreservation of reproductive material is to achieve
pregnancy using ART.169 For example, one recent study revealed that over eighty-eight
percent (88%) of stored embryos are for use to achieve pregnancy.170 When a couple stores
household items at a local storage facility, the facility typically lacks knowledge regarding
the purpose for which the items are stored. The same is not true when reproductive material
is stored.
Second, language in the cryopreservation contract itself, which is usually drafted by the
storage facility’s counsel and given to aspiring parents to sign, typically provides notice to
the defendant that the reproductive material is being stored to achieve a later pregnancy.
Some contracts for the storage of embryos include specific language stating that the
purpose of storage is to preserve embryos for a future attempt at pregnancy. 171 In fact, a
cryopreservation agreement may require the clients to describe in detail the later use of the
stored materials.172 Even when an agreement does not expressly state the purpose of storage
is to achieve a future pregnancy, the purpose often is implied by an agreement’s discussion
of IVF and thawing of the reproductive material. For example, one cryopreservation
agreement states that embryo cryopreservation is “part of the usual process of In Vitro
Fertilization” and provides an “opportunity for a future embryo transfer cycle” where the
“the frozen embryos can subsequently be thawed and transferred to the uterus in either a
natural menstrual cycle or a hormonally controlled cycle.”173 Based on such language, the
storage is clearly acknowledged to be for the purpose of achieving a later pregnancy.
Third, storage of cryopreserved reproductive material, unlike the storage of household
items at a local storage facility, requires individuals to hire medical professionals.
Cryopreservation of reproductive material is a vital part of the ART medical process in
which aspiring parents seek the assistance of fertility experts to achieve pregnancy and give
birth to a child.174 Aspiring parents who use ART are referred to as “patients.”175Healthcare
professionals who practice ART include physicians and other fertility experts.176 As a
result, these medical professionals are likely to have actual knowledge of
169 Id. at 1068 (noting that 88.2% of stored embryos are used by patients to achieve pregnancy). ASRM survey results
indicate that less than three percent of cryopreserved embryos are stored for research purposes, and less than one percent
are stored for use in quality assurance activities. Id.
170
Id.
171 See, e.g., Boston IVF, supra note 20 (contract states “The purpose of embryo freezing is to save embryos for a future
attempt to establish a pregnancy.”); see also California Center for Reproductive Health, Consent for Cryopreservation of
Embryos, at 1 (2018), https://sa1s3.patientpop.com/assets/docs/65131.pdf (“We understand that the purpose of
cryopreservation (freezing) of embryos is to increase the possibility of achieving pregnancy at a future time.”) [hereinafter
California Center]; Randy S. Morris, M.D., Embryo Cryopreservation Agreement, at 1, https://www.ivf1.com/pdf/Embryofreezing-consent.pdf (“The embryos can later be thawed. . . for an embryo transfer to attempt pregnancy.”) [hereinafter
Morris].
172 See, e.g., Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 1 (contract states: “The Client desires to store the reproductive materials
for later use or other disposition as instructed by the Client in a separate notarized agreement.”).
173 Women’s Specialty & Fertility Center Inc., Consent and Storage Agreement for Embryo Cryopreservation and
Storage Program, at 1 (2015), https://wsfc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/EmbryoCryoStorageAgreement_20200515.pdf [hereinafter Women’s Specialty].
174
See Guide for Patients, supra note 21, at 3; see also Hnylka, Traditional Barriers, supra note 12, at 361-62
(discussing ART as a medical process requiring patients to hire physicians and other fertility healthcare professionals).
175
See Guide for Patients, supra note 23 (the title of the guide indicates aspiring parents who use ART are “patients”).
176 Id. at 20.
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the purpose for which reproductive material is stored and they are well aware of the
emotional rollercoaster experienced by their patients. Based on the above, clinics and ART
practitioners know or at minimum should know that the cryopreserved reproductive
material is being stored to achieve pregnancy, and it requires no stretch of the imagination
to recognize that these professionals foresee, at the time they require their patients to
execute an agreement to cryopreserve reproductive material, that a breach resulting in the
loss of the aspiring parents’ reproductive material is particularly likely to result in severe
emotional disturbance.
Finally, the purpose of the storage agreement,
unlike the storage of household items at
a local storage facility, is the preservation of the opportunity for reproduction – the stored
material represents the opportunity of the aspiring parents to become pregnant with their
own biological child. This is why the court in Witt found the aspiring parents’ relationship
with their ART practitioner to be analogous to the relationship immediate family members
have with a mortician.177 Both relationships involve important dignity interests, individuals
who are particularly vulnerable emotionally, and individuals who are heavilydependent on
the practitioner's diligence. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 353 recognizes
that a breach of contract by a mortician is a situation where emotional disturbance damages
are particularly likely and, as a result, are foreseeable. Therefore, the same should be true
regarding a breach by ART clinics and practitioners. The nature of the transaction, the
purpose of the contract to store reproductive material, and the surrounding circumstances
put defendants on notice at the time of contracting that serious emotional disturbance was
“particularly likely” to result from a breach.
C.

Certainty

In order for consequential damages to be recoverable, they must meet the test of certainty.
It is not sufficient to simply argue that consequential damages for emotional disturbance
were foreseeable at the time of contracting. Regarding breach of contract damages, the
certainty requirement has two aspects: first, damages must be demonstrated with certainty
to have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof
with reasonable certainty.178 Regarding these two aspects, courts have found that the first
aspect is the primary focus; courts have noted the certainty requirement has been held to
apply “to situations where the fact of damages is uncertain, not where the amount is
uncertain.”179 The purpose of the certainty requirement is to avoid awards of damages that
are fabricated or based upon conjecture or speculation.180 At first glance, it might appear
177 Witt. 977 A.2d at 789–90.
178 Coastal Aviation, Inc. v. Commander Aircraft Co., 937 F. Supp. 1051, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1369 (2d
Cir. 1997)(regarding recovery of lost profits as consequential damages under New York common law, “[f]irst, it must be
demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be
capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words, the damages may not be merely speculative, possible or
imaginary, but must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening
causes.); accord Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 873 (Colo. 2002).
179 Vanderbeek, 50 P.3d at 873; HUNTER, supra note 54, at § 13:13 (“Although recovery will not be denied merely
because the amount of damages is hard to determine, damages must not be left to speculation and conjecture.”) (citing
Optical Partners Inc., v. Dang, 381 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Ark. 2011)). But see Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg.,
Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 111 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In addition to proving that the existence of damage is reasonably certain, and that
the damages were foreseeable and within the contemplation of both parties, a party claiming consequential damages must
also prove the amount of damage with “reasonable certainty.”).
180
Vanderbeek., 50 P.3d at 873; Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 577 P.2d 347, 350 (Idaho 1978); Best Beach Getaways, LLC v.
TSYS Merchant solutions, LLC, No. 20-CV-01962-NRN, 2021 WL 3206300, at *10 (D. Colo. July 29, 2021); In re
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there should be no uncertainty regarding the fact of damages caused by the breach in lost
or destroyed reproductive materials cases. After all, the defendant lost or destroyed
reproductive material, and this breach resulted in damages. However, the lack of certainty
typically does not concern general damages which necessarily flow from the breach such
paid storage fees, but instead is raised when one examines consequential damages,
especially those for emotional harm. Are such damages, in fact, caused by the breach or
are they speculative and the result of conjecture? Why is there any doubt that the aspiring
parents’ emotional disturbance damages were, in fact, caused by defendant’s breach when
defendant lost or destroyed the aspiring parents’ reproductive material? As discussed
earlier, the most severe disturbance typically will result when a couple loses the
opportunity to become pregnant with their own biological child. In such situations, the fact
the emotional disturbance damages are caused by defendant’s breach is arguably
speculative because counsel for ART professionals may contend that, although plaintiffs
wished to use the reproductive material in the IVF process, a viable pregnancy is never
guaranteed, and a viable pregnancy only results in a small percentage of IVF cases.
Therefore, even if plaintiff is suffering severe emotional disturbance, the defendant may
argue the disturbance is not causally linked to the breach but instead is based on mere
speculation and conjecture regarding a remote possibility of pregnancy. This was the
argument made by the defendant in Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode
Island,181 discussed earlier.182
In Frisina, when the defendant hospital lost or destroyed three couples’ stored embryos,
the defendant disturbance was due to the loss of the possibility of achieving pregnancy, and
argued the hospital never guaranteed pregnancy.183 In fact, defense counsel argued the
couples “did not actually suffer any loss” because the chance of pregnancy using the stored
material was twenty percent.184 Based on the above, defense counsel argued that any link
between the breach and the couple’s emotional disturbance damages was speculative and
fails to meet certainty requirements for recovery.185 However, the Frisina court rejected
defense counsel’s arguments186and ruled that the couples were seeking to recover for
emotional harm cause by the loss of the embryos, not the loss of the opportunity to achieve
pregnancy.187 Although the emotional harm was indeed caused by the loss of the
Mullins, No. 16-13773-JGR, 2020 WL 5846952, at *30 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2020), aff'd, No. AP 16-01282, 2021
WL 2679137 (10th Cir. BAP (Colo.) June 30, 2021).
181 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9.
182 See supra Part III.A.3.
183 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9.
184 Id. It should be noted that Frisina was decided in 2002 and use of ART has dramatically increased over the past ten
years. See authorities cited supra notes 23-24. Because ART has become more common and techniques continue to be
improved and refined, the success rate has continued to increase in every age group. Niven Todd, Infertility and In Vitro
Fertilization: What are the Success Rates for IVF?, WebMD (Aug. 1, 2021), https://www.webmd.com/infertility-andreproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization; see also IVF1, Frozen Embryo Transfer Success, https://ivf1.com/frozen-embryotransfer-success/ (“Frozen embryo transfer success has improved dramatically over the last several years. In the past, the
chance for pregnancy using frozen embryos seemed to be lower than the transfer of fresh embryos. More recent data,
however, suggests that this is no longer true.”) In fact, the rate of success has been linked to a woman’s age. Niven Todd,
Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: Are there Other Issues with IVF to Consider?, WebMD (Aug. 1, 2021),
https://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization. For example, a woman under the age of
35 has almost a 40% chance of having a baby using IVF. Id. On the other hand, it has been reported that the chance of
having a baby using IVF is only 11.5% for a woman over 40. Id.
185 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9. In addition, defense counsel argued damages would be difficult to calculate. Id.
186
Id.
187 Id. at *10.
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embryos, the Frisina court seems to imply the emotional harm flows naturally from the
breach in all such cases because defendant lost or destroyed plaintiffs’ “irreplaceable
property.”188 Perhaps the court wished to sidestep defendant’s argument that the loss was
uncertain because a pregnancy was never promised and the likelihood of pregnancy was
statistically low. However, the lost opportunity to achieve pregnancy is not speculative but,
instead, is a real loss. Although successful pregnancy using IVF was statistically unlikely,
one must not confuse a loss of pregnancy — which was never guaranteed — witha loss of
the opportunity to become pregnant using the lost or destroyed reproductive material. This
loss is real, not speculative, and is particularly likely to cause severe emotional disturbance
when the lost or destroyed reproductive material represented a couple’s only chance to
become pregnant with their own biological child. 189 As the courtnoted in Witt:
Regardless of the likelihood of success [of IVF], the lost opportunity to
even attempt utilization of anticipated technologies at all can lead to
understandable fear or anxiety, which is especially so in this case in
which the recommendation and plan—indeed, the hope—was created by
the defendant, and the consequence of the defendant's alleged action is to
foreclose the potential for the plaintiffs to ever conceive a child together.
Accordingly, the court concludes that it was reasonably foreseeable for
the defendant to appreciate that it’s discarding the ovarian tissue could
result in the type of overwhelming anxiety sufficient to cause illness or
bodily harm.190
Thus, the statistical likelihood of achieving pregnancy need not thwart aspiring parents’
attempt to recover consequential emotional disturbance damages based on lack of certainty.
The certainty inquiry should not focus on the statistical likelihood of pregnancy, but rather
should focus on the lost opportunity itself, which is real, not speculative. In situations
where there is no question the defendants lost or destroyed the plaintiff’s reproductive
material, that breach deprived plaintiffs the opportunity to use that reproductive material
to achieve pregnancy; therefore, plaintiff’s resulting emotional disturbance damages are
causally linked to the breach. 191
188 Id. But see Hardin, 527 S.W.3d at 433 (noting plaintiff’s emotional distress was not caused by the loss of his stored
sperm, but instead was caused by the fact that a third party improperly used the sperm to become pregnant; the court noted
the suit likely would not have been filed if defendant had thrown the sperm in the trash.). Also, as discussed supra notes
125-129 and accompanying text, not every individual will suffer emotional disturbance when reproductive material is lost
or destroyed.
189 One might argue this distinction still suffers from certainty problems because the low probability of achieving
pregnancy using IVF also renders the “opportunity” to achieve pregnancy illusory or speculative, at best. However, due to
advances in technology and storage techniques, a woman under the age of 35 has almost a 40% chance of having a baby
using IVF. Niven Todd, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: Are there Other Issues with IVF to Consider?, WebMD (Aug.
1, 2021), https://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization.
190
Witt, 977 A.2d at 788; see also Stewart v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 207 A.D.2d 703, 704 (N.Y.
1994) (noting that even if the plaintiff lost only a five or ten percent chance of achieving pregnancy naturally, that loss
would support emotional disturbance damages); Estate of Stephenson v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 966 (2016 unreported)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant and ruling that loss of opportunity to experience a live birth is a compensable
injury that will support a medical malpractice action); Brodsky v. Osunkwo, No. A-4195-10T1, 2012 WL 1161598, at *2
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 10, 2012) (stating lost opportunity to store sperm prior to cancer treatment that rendered
patient infertile is a compensable injury that will support a cause of action for medical malpractice).
191 Yet another possible solution to the lack of certainty problem when reproductive material is lost or destroyed is to use
the loss of chance doctrine currently used in medical malpractice cases. See Fox, Reproductive Negligence, supra note 20,
at 227 (stating that loss of chance doctrine could be used “beyond the medical malpractice paradigm” in cases involving
reproductive injuries.) For example, let’s assume plaintiff had a thirty percent chance to achieve pregnancy via IVF using
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Even if certainty regarding the fact of damages causally linked to the breach is overcome,
must Plaintiffs also establish the amount of their emotional disturbance damages with
reasonable certainty? Cases vary on this point.192 Many courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have adopted the view that as long as there is certainty regarding the fact
of damage attributable to the wrong, there is no need to establish the amount of damages
with certainty:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but
there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction
between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that
petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which precludes
the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain
result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount.193
One reason courts have not denied damages even when the amount could not be ascertained
with certainty is that denial of such damages permits the wrongdoer to profit from their

the frozen embryo which defendant lost or destroyed. Under the loss of chance doctrine, plaintiff would not be barred
recovery, but should instead be permitted to recover for the lost opportunity, with damages reduced based on the
corresponding likelihood of pregnancy. See Fox, Intangible Losses, supra note 9, at 464 (endorsing “probabilistic
recovery” as a way to compute damages when embryos are lost or destroyed.) In the malpractice context, the doctrine is
used when, due to a medical professional’s negligence, a plaintiff loses an opportunity or chance to have a particular
medical procedure performed and, as a result of that lost chance, the plaintiff experiences extensive pain and/or suffering.
Est. of Josephine Ruth Stephenson v. Harrison, 838 P.3d 759 (Nev. 2016) (citing Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345,
348-49 (Nev. 1995)); see also Holton v. Memorial Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (Ill. 1997); McDaniel v. Ong, 724
N.E.2d 38, 43 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999). Courts have acknowledged that the loss of chance doctrine is in fact a causation doctrine
rather than one focusing on injury or damages. Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). However,
courts also have criticized the doctrine’s use in the medical malpractice context as an improper way to bypass traditional
causation requirements. See, e.g., id. at 585-86. However, this article posits that a traditional approach to consequential
damages need not raise problems of certainty. As a result, while the loss of chance doctrine may prove useful in some
reproductive tort actions, the doctrine is not needed to establish entitlement to breach of contract consequential emotional
disturbance damages when reproductive material is lost or destroyed.
192 See Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury, and Damages, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 843 (1999)(“The contract requirement that damages be shown within reasonable certainty has lost
some of its force in recent years, as some courts essentially have abandoned the rule by requiring only that the fact of the
loss, as opposed to its extent, be proved with reasonable certainty.”) [hereinafter Norton, Assisted Reproduction]. Many
cases which require certainty as to the amount of damages are cases involving future loss, such as future lost earnings or
profits. See, e.g,, Acoustic Mktg. Rsch., Inc. v. Technics, LLC, 198 P.3d 96, 98 (Colo. 2008) (in a case for future losses
from breach of a royalty agreement, court required “sufficient admissible evidence which would enable the trier of fact to
compute a fair approximation of the loss.”); Kenford Co. v. Erie Cty., 493 N.E.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. 1986)(loss of future
profits must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty). In fact, one court noted “the reasonable certainty standard was
developed in this country in the last century as a device for controlling jury verdicts in lost profits cases.” Tull v.
Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 944n.3 (Colo. 1985) (citing MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, Ch. 4, § 25 (1935)).
193
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927)(“A defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the
ascertainment of the precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured
with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.”); Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945
(Col. 1985)(explaining uncertainty as to amount of damages will not bar recovery); Bowman v. Zimny, 628 N.E.2d 384,
388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)(“Absolute certainty regarding the amount of damages is not necessary to justify recovery. ...... ”);
JMR Constr. Corp. v. Env't Assessment & Remediation Mgmt., Inc., 585, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), as
modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 28, 2016)(“Where the fact of damages is certain .... the amount of damages need not be
calculated with absolute certainty.”) But see Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 111 (2d
Cir. 2007)(recognizing that although certainty as to the amount of damages is not necessary for general damages, but is
necessary for consequential damages: “In addition to proving that the existence of damage is reasonably certain, and that
the damages were foreseeable and within the contemplation of both parties, a party claiming consequential damages must
also prove the amount of damage with “reasonable certainty.”).
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wrongdoing and leaves injured plaintiffs undercompensated.194 It has been suggested that
justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer should bear the risk of uncertainty
caused by their own wrongful act.195 In any event, computing the amount of emotional
disturbance damages is a task undertaken by juries throughout the nation on a daily basis.
Computation of damage awards for nonpecuniary loss may be difficult, but that is no reason
to deny damages. The computation of damages with reasonable certainty “leaves much to
the discretion of the fact-finder.”196 In fact, over one hundred years ago, Judge Cardozo
noted “[n]o formula can be framed, regardless of experience, to tell us in advance when
approximate certainty may be attained.”197 Although it may be difficult for a jury to
compute the amount of emotional disturbance consequential damages when reproductive
material is lost or destroyed, it should be no more difficult than computing nonpecuniary
damages in other types of cases where emotional harm is present.198 Finally, regarding any
potential uncertainty as to the amount of damages, such concerns may be addressed by
including a liquidated damages clause in the cryopreservation contract.199
V.

EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN CRYOPRESERVATION CONTRACTS

Most cryopreservation agreements contain broad, sweeping exculpatory clauses that are
intended to exculpate clinics and ART practitioners from all liability, including liability
based on lack of due care. As explained below, exculpatory clauses will not be enforced
if they violate public policy or are used in private agreements that are so important to the
public good that the agreement is one which affects or implicates public policy. Both of
these grounds for nonenforcement are raised by cryopreservation agreements. Although
exculpatory clauses play an important role in the growth, survival, and continued
affordability of ART services, including cryopreservation, this section posits that such
clauses should not be enforced when they attempt to negate a basic duty of due care
regarding the core obligations of clinics and ART practitioners.
A.

Typical Contractual Language Used to Limit Liability

When reproductive material is cryogenically preserved and stored, most ART clinics and

194 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564 (1931).
195 Id. at 565.
196 Trans-W. Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 718 F. App'x 712, 718 (10th Cir. 2018).
197 Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 121 N.E. 756, 757 (N.Y. 1919); Trans-W. Petroleum, Inc. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 718 F. App'x 712, 718 (10th Cir. 2018).
198
See Fox, Intangible Losses, supra note 9, at 455-59 (arguing that damage calculation in cases involving reproductive
harm is no more difficult than damage calculations “for claims of nuisance, trespass, or slander – let alone torts like
wrongful death, wrongful conviction, and wrongful imprisonment.”); see also Norton, Assisted Reproduction, supra note
192, at 839-42 (noting that emotional injury damages in actions alleging frustration of genetic affinity may be difficult to
compute, but arguably are no more difficult to compute than nonpecuniary injuries on other types of cases).
199 See Norton, Assisted Reproduction, supra note 192, at 819-20 (noting that liquidated damages clauses in contracts
involving assisted reproduction may be helpful to solve damages valuation problems); see also Ovation Fertility, supra
note 20, at 3 (containing a liquidated damage clause which states “Client agrees that in no event shall Ovation’s total
liability for all damages in any one or more causes of action, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, exceed $25,000 ......... ”).
Scholars also have suggested other potential solutions. For example, one scholar has suggested using the loss of chance
doctrine to adjust the amount of damages. See Fox, Reproductive Negligence, supra note 20, at 199-200. But see In re
Medical Review Panel of Zsa Dunjee, 57 So. 3d 541, 552 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (stating although physician was negligent, it
was mere “conjecture” that plaintiff would have been able to become pregnant).
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practitioners have the aspiring parents sign a written agreement.200 Courts have described
the parties’ agreement to cryopreserve reproductive material as creating a bailment
contract.201 As would be expected, one common characteristic of these storage agreements
is that they seek to limit the liability of the clinic and ART practitioners for loss or
destruction of the stored reproductive materials. The limitation of liability language
contained in the Boston IVF contract is typical of many storage agreements. The Boston
IVF limitation clause states, in pertinent part:
With any technique requiring mechanical support systems, including the
cryopreservation of human embryos, equipment failure and technical
problems may occur. Boston IVF, its directors and employees shall not be
held liable for any damage, loss or problems due to improper freezing,
maintenance, storage, withdrawal, thawing and/or delivery caused by
human error, malfunction of the storage tank, failure of utilities, strike by
workers, cessation of services or other labor disturbances, any war, acts of
public enemy or other disturbances such as fire, wind, earthquake,
flooding or other acts of God.202
Similar limitations of liability are found in most reproductive material storage contracts.203
For example, the “Consent for Cryopreservation of Embryos” agreement used by the
California Center for Reproductive Health also contains broad language absolving the
clinic and its employees for any conduct, including human error, that results in the loss or
destruction of stored embryos:
We also acknowledge that the freezing of embryos requires the use of
mechanical support systems and the involvement of human technicians.
We recognize that the practice of medicine is not an exact science and
200 See authorities cited supra note 14. In the rare event defendant argues that no written contract exists, courts
nevertheless may find a bailment contract exists based on consent forms and other documents signed by the aspiring
parents. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 1256, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)(finding consent forms and
other documents “when considered together, sufficiently demonstrate a written bailment contract needed to withstand a
motion to dismiss ....... ”).
201 See, e.g., Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1275-76 (embryo storage and transfer documents constituted a bailment contract); York,
717 F. Supp. at 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“[C]ryopreservation agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship between the
plaintiffs and defendants.”).
202 Boston IVF, supra note 20, at 1.
203 See, e.g., Main Line Fertility Center, supra note 20, at 16 (“We agree to absolve, release, indemnify, protect and hold
harmless Main Line Fertility and their respective members, medical staff, managers, agents, and employees in event that
any embryo and/or egg(s) frozen and stored with MLF are damaged or destroyed as a result of the events detailed herein, or
other potential unforeseen circumstance.”); Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 3 (accepting duty of reasonable care but
noting “Under no circumstances and legal theory, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, shall Ovation, its suppliers,
successors or assignees, be liable to Client or Child born of the reproductive materials or any other person for any indirect,
incidental, consequential or special damages whatsoever, arising out of the freezing, shipment, storage, or related services
rendered by Ovation.”); Women’s Specialty, supra note 173, at 2 (contract notes: “Some accidents may occur in the
laboratory, which would jeopardize or destroy the embryos. These include, by way of example but not limited to: 1. Failure
of freezing equipment to function normally 2. Failure of the storage system to preserve the embryos 3. Human error”);
Memphis Fertility Laboratory, Inc., Consent to Cryopreservation (Freezing) and Storage of Embryo(s), at 2 (April 8,
2015), http://fertilitymemphis.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Consent-for-Embryo-Freezing-and-Storage-2015.pdf
(“We hereby release MFL, its’ agents, servants, or employees from any injury or damage, known or unknown, that might
result should the frozen embryo(s) cease to be viable while in the custody of MFL, its agents, servants, or employees.”);
California Center, supra note 171, at 1 (“We acknowledge that human error, equipment failure or unknown factors (i.e.
catastrophic events such as earthquakes or fires…) could negatively affect the viability of the embryos. We specifically
acknowledge and agree that CCRH, its affiliate laboratory, or any of its employees will not be liable for any destruction,
damage, or loss to our embryos as a result of freezing, maintenance, storage, removal from storage, thawing, and/or
delivery of the frozen embryos, or related services.”).
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understand that techniques for embryo cryopreservation and thawing are
relatively new and are not universally established. We acknowledge that
human error, equipment failure or unknown factors (i.e., catastrophic
events such as earthquakes or fires…) could negatively affect the viability
of the embryos. We specifically acknowledge and agree that CCRH, its
affiliate laboratory, or any of its employees will not be liable for any
destruction, damage, or loss to our embryos as a result of freezing,
maintenance, storage, removal from storage, thawing, and/or delivery of
the frozen embryos, or related services. We also acknowledge that any
non-viable embryos, as determined by the embryology laboratory, may be
discarded.204
The broad, sweeping nature of the exculpatory clauses used in these storage contracts is
noteworthy. Not only does the contractual language seek to absolve the clinic, its directors,
and its employees for storage tank malfunctions, but also for “human error” which arguably
includes ordinary acts of negligence.205 In fact, some cryopreservation storage contracts
expressly limit liability for negligence.206 The language places the risk of harm on the
aspiring parents “for any damage, loss or problems” not only for risks related to the storage
of the reproductive material, but also the freezing, maintenance, withdrawal, thawing, and
delivery.207 In short, whether proceeding to recover damages using a tort or contract theory,
the clause’s purpose is to insulate the storage facility and ART practitioners from any
damages due to harm, loss or destruction of the stored reproductive material. Some storage
contracts contain even more specific language, expressly excluding consequential
damages, such as damages for emotional harm caused by the loss or destruction. For
example, the “Reproductive Materials Cryopreservation & Storage Agreement” used by
Ovation Fertility in Austin, Texas, states, in pertinent part: “Under no circumstances and
legal theory, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, shall Ovation, its suppliers, successors
or assignees, be liable to Client or Child born of the reproductive materials or any other
person for any indirect, incidental, consequential or special damages whatsoever, arising
204 California Center, supra note 171, at 2.
205 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Gen. Dynamics Armament & Tech. Prod., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1183 (D. Haw.
2010)(equating human error with negligence); Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 2010-Ohio-356, 2010 WL
396021, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App Feb. 5, 2001)(noting human error “might mean negligence”); Mut. Marine Off., Inc. v.
Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 351, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(equating reference to “human error” in exculpatory
clause with negligence); DeSmet ex rel. Est. of Hays v. Cty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1040 (Ill. 2006)(noting
human error “suggests an assertion of negligence”). Not all storage contracts seek to shield the clinic and its employees
from ordinary negligence. See, e.g., Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 3 (noting “Ovation's obligation to Client is to
exercise reasonable care in providing freezing and storage services as set forth in this Agreement.”).
206 See, e.g., Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 3 (“Client also agrees that in the event of loss or destruction or reduced
viability of Client’s reproductive materials by any reason whatsoever including but not limited to negligence, damages as a
result thereof would be highly conjectural and speculative and would be difficult to determine.”).
207
Id. Regarding non-payment of storage fees, storage contracts typically give the clinic the express right to destroy the
reproductive materials after attempts are made to provide notice regarding nonpayment of storage fees. See, e.g., Main Line
Fertility Center, supra note 20, at 13 (“In situations where there is either: 1) No contact by Patient and/or Spouse/Partner
with MLFC for a period of 3 years, or 2) A failure to pay fees for and associated with embryo storage for a period of 3
years and MLFC has made reasonable efforts to contact Patient and Spouse/Partner by mailing the bill to the last known
address. We expressly understand, agree, and authorize MLFC to discard our embryo(s) in accordance with its normal
laboratory procedures and applicable law without further notice to, or consent required by, Patient or Spouse/Partner”);
Boston IVF, supra note 20, at 1 (“If there is failure to make payments for two years of embryo storage, after reasonable
notification of such nonpayment mailed to our last known address as provided to Boston IVF by us, we understand that
Boston IVF reserves the right to thaw and discard the embryos without further notice to us.”); Women’s Specialty, supra
note 173, at 3 (“If the staff at Women’s Specialty & Fertility Center, Inc., has received no response to these phone
calls/letters/emails, and/or we refuse to pay the current charges, the embryos will be considered abandoned and the staff
may dispose of the embryos as described under section “Disposition of Frozen Embryos”.”).
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out of the freezing, shipment, storage, or related services rendered by Ovation.”208 In other
words, reminiscent of the recent destruction of embryos at University Hospital Fertility
Clinic in Cleveland,209 if an employee failed to turn on the temperature alarm on the
cryogenic storage tank, and the storage tank thawed and destroyed all of the stored
embryos, the contractual language quoted above was intended to exclude consequential
damages for emotional harm. Although one purpose parties choose to contract is to allocate
the risks involved in their transaction or relationship, the broad sweeping language
contained in a majority of cryopreservation contracts raises the following question: what
risks are assumed by the storage facility and ART professionals? Although
cryopreservation is a sophisticated scientific process involving fertility experts and other
highly trained healthcare professionals, these contracts appear to place all risk on aspiring
parents and, in essence, attempt to place the storage of reproductive material on the same
footing as storage of household items at a local storage facility. If broad, sweeping
exculpatory clauses place all risk of harm, loss, and destruction on aspiring parents,
including those attributable to equipment failure and human error/negligence, then the
storage facility, in reality, is merely renting storage space in the cryopreservation tank,
without any responsibility for “freezing, maintenance, storage, removal from storage,
thawing, and/or delivery of the frozen embryos, or related services.” The obvious question
is: are these exculpatory clauses enforceable?
B.

Enforcement of Exculpatory Clauses in Cryopreservation Agreements

Case law addressing the enforceability of exculpatory clauses in cryopreservation
agreements is sparse. Most cases which have addressed the enforceability of
cryopreservation agreements have dealt with enforceability of language regarding the
disposition of cryopreserved reproductive material when individuals who stored the
material either divorce, separate, or die.210 In cases where disposition of cryopreserved
reproductive material was at issue, courts have routinely upheld the enforceability of the

208 Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 3 (accepting duty of reasonable care but noting “Under no circumstances and legal
theory, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, shall Ovation, its suppliers, successors or assignees, be liable to Client or
Child born of the reproductive materials or any other person for any indirect, incidental, consequential or special damages
whatsoever, arising out of the freezing, shipment, storage, or related services rendered by Ovation.”).
209
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 988 (Conn. 2019)(holding cryopreservation contract language regarding
disposition of embryos after divorce was enforceable); Est. of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008)(enforcing husband’s agreement with the company storing his frozen sperm that the sperm was to be destroyed upon
his death); Terrell v. Torres, 456 P.3d 13, 17 (Ariz. 2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020)(in divorce situation, “court was
required to enforce the parties’ chosen disposition of the embryos as set forth in the [cryopreservation] Agreement.”); J.B.
v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001)(recognizing “persuasive reasons exist for enforcing preembryo disposition agreements” after divorce); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998)(“Agreements between
progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes [after divorce] should generally be presumed
valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), on
reh'g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992)(“An agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred
pre-embryos in the event of contingencies [including divorce] . . . should be presumed valid and should be enforced as
between the progenitors”); Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013)(“The best approach for
resolving disputes over the disposition of pre-embryos created with one party's sperm and another party's ova is to honor
the parties' own mutually expressed intent as set forth in their prior agreements.”); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54
(Tex. App. 2006)(enforcing embryo agreement that provides that the frozen embryos are to be discarded in the event of
divorce.). But see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000)(holding divorce court “would not enforce an
agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will” because such an agreement violates
public policy.); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)(“The section of the informed
consent regarding the duration of storage cannot be read as an agreement between Husband and Wife to destroy the preembryos at the end of three years” as husband contended when divorcing wife).
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cryopreservation agreements.211 In fact, courts have held disposition language in
cryopreservation agreements is presumptively valid in disputes between the two aspiring
parents.212 Disposition language in cryopreservation contracts is presumed to be valid for
several reasons, including: the typical dispute regarding disposition is between the two
aspiring parent “progenitors” and their wishes always control in matters of disposition of
the stored material;213 aspiring parents are typically given choices by storage facilities
regarding disposition and disposition language in the contract is, therefore, an expression
of choice;214 and, the aspiring parents’ choice of contractual language regarding disposition
is usually made after lengthy conversation and discussion.215 This reasoning does not apply
to exculpatory language in a cryopreservation agreement. First, unlike disposition clauses,
exculpatory clauses typically are not used in suits between the two aspiring parents, but
instead are used against the aspiring parents when the aspiring parents sue the storage
facility and/or ART professionals for misconduct. This distinction is key. The principal
reason courts are willing to enforce disposition language in a suit between the two aspiring
parents is because the disposition clause expresses the aspiring parents’ own intent -memorialized by their selection of a disposition option they agreed upon -- and the aspiring
parents’ intent is paramount in disposition cases. The same is not true for exculpatory
clauses. Exculpatory clauses are not used in suits between the aspiring parents; they do not
express the aspiring parents’ intent and, in suits against ART professionals when
reproductive material is lost or destroyed, the honoring of the aspiring parents’ intent is not
paramount, as it is in disposition cases. Therefore, the principal reason why disposition
clauses are presumed valid does not extend or apply to exculpatory clauses.
Second, unlike language regarding disposition of stored reproductive material, the
exculpatory language in a cryopreservation agreement is not an expression of choice. To
the contrary, the language usually is drafted by counsel for the storage facility and inserted
211 See cases cited supra note 210.
212See, e.g., Bilbao, 217 A.3d at 988 (“[A] disposition agreement between progenitors is presumed enforceable between
them.”); Terrell, 456 P.3d at 15 (same); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete
donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes [after divorce] should generally be presumed valid and binding, and
enforced in any dispute between them.”); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“An agreement regarding disposition of any
untransferred pre-embryos in the event of contingencies [including divorce] . . . should be presumed valid and should be
enforced as between the progenitors”); Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 515 (“We therefore join those courts that have held that
‘[a]greements between progenitors or gamete donors regarding the disposition of their prezygotes should generally be
presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.’”). But see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057
(Mass. 2000) (holding divorce court “would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent
against his or her will” because such an agreement violates public policy.).
213 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“[P]rogenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, retain
decision-making authority as to their disposition.”); Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 515 (“We believe that the best approach for
resolving disputes over the disposition of preembryos ........ is to honor the parties’ own mutually expressed intent as set
forth in their prior agreements.”); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (explaining courts should “honor the parties’ expressions of
choice, made before disputes erupt, with the parties over-all direction always uppermost in the analysis.”); Bilbao, 217
A.3d at 986 (“[P]rogenitors should be the primary decision-makers regarding disposition of their preembryos.”).
214 See Bilbao, 217 A.3d at 981 (noting the agreement provided four checkbox options for disposition of the pre-embryos
upon death or divorce); Terrell, 456 P.3d at 14 (stating the agreement described three alternate dispositions of stored
reproductive material in the event of separation, divorce, death or incapacitation); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176, 180 (explaining
agreement required aspiring parents to make “informed decisions regarding disposition of the fertilized eggs” and the
agreement contained the parties’ “expressions of choice”); Liftowitz, 48 P.3d at 263-64 (stating agreement required aspiring
parents to select from various options regarding disposition of pre-embryos).
215 See Bilbao, 217 A.3d at 986 (stating progenitors’ decision regarding disposition promotes serious discussion); J.B. v.
M..B., 783 A.2d at 710 (explaining husband claimed to have “long and serious discussions” with his wife regarding
disposition and stated they “agreed that no matter what happened the eggs would be either utilized by us or by other
infertile couples.”) Also, as a matter of common sense, if a couple is given various choices regarding disposition of their
stored reproductive material in the event of separation, divorce, incapacity or death, they most likely would discuss the
available choices and agree upon them prior to making their selections in an agreement.
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into pre-printed agreements or consent forms. Exculpatory language in cryopreservation
agreements usually is not the subject of negotiation. Aspiring parents either accept the
language or transfer their entire IVF journey to another clinic, which is no easy task. Third,
unlike disposition language, exculpatory language is not agreed upon after lengthy
discussion regarding options. The decision regarding disposition of cryopreserved
reproductive material in the event of death, divorce, or separation usually sparks
conversation. Aspiring parents typically will discuss available options. The same is not true
regarding exculpatory language in a cryopreservation contract. Typically, the exculpatory
language is not discussed, not open to negotiation, and not explained in depth.As courts
have noted: “the parties initial ‘informed consent’ to IVF procedures will often not be truly
informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating, emotionally and
psychologically, all the turns that events may take as the IVF process unfolds.” 216 As a
result, the inquiry into the validity and enforceability of exculpatory clauses is quite
different from the inquiry regarding the validity and enforceability of disposition clauses.217
The reasons for presuming the enforceability of disposition clauses do not apply to
exculpatory clauses.
When considering the validity and enforceability of an exculpatory clause, it is important
to keep in mind that the ability to freely contract is fundamental to the law of contracts.218
Therefore, parties are free to allocate risk and also may “avoid some duties and liabilities
that would normally be part of the contractual relationship.” 219 There is a natural tension,
however, between contract law’s protection of the fundamental freedom to contract and
allocate risk, and the public policy which disfavors contractual language that allows a party
to escape liability for their own wrongdoing.220 Perhaps as a result of this tension, the courts
disfavor exculpatory clauses221 but, nevertheless, will typically uphold such clausesunless
they violate public policy,222 such as exculpatory clauses that release a party from

216 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
217 See Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *12 (noting that the validity and enforcement of disposition language in a
cryopreservation contract is separate and distinct from an inquiry into the validity and enforcement of exculpatory
language.).
218Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Const. Co., 582 P.2d 1111, 1118 (Kan. 1978)(stating the law encourages
competent parties to freely contract and “contracts freely arrived at and fairly made are favorites of the law.”); Boise Mode,
LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 294 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Idaho 2013)(same).
219 Boise Mode, LLC, 294 P.3d at 1119 (citing Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho
1979)); see also Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nomura Credit & Cap., Inc., 92 N.E.3d 743, 748 (N.Y.
2017)(“[C]ourts must honor contractual provisions that limit liability or damages because those provisions represent the
parties' agreement on the allocation of the risk of economic loss in certain eventualities.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble
Lowndes Int'l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 507 (N.Y. 1994)(“A limitation on liability provision in a contract represents the
parties' Agreement on the allocation of the risk of economic loss in the event that the contemplated transaction is not fully
executed, which the courts should honor.”).
220
See Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP, 565 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tenn. 2018)(discussing this tension,
in particular, as it relates to a party being excused from liability for their own negligence).
221 Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Const. Co., 582 P.2d 1111, 1119 (Kan. 1978)(stating “private contracts
exculpating one from the consequences of his own acts are looked upon with disfavor by the courts” and will be strictly
construed); Valeo v. Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)(“[C]ontracts providing for
immunity from liability are not favorites of the law and will be construed strictly.”); Frizzell v. DeYoung, 478, 415 P.3d
341, 346 (Idaho 2018)(same); Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 1199 (Pa. 2012)(same); Maybank v. BB&T
Corp., 787 S.E.2d 498, 515 (S.C. 2016)(same); see also 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21 (4th ed. May 2021 Update).
222 Jijun Yin v. Aguiar, P.3d 911, 927 (Haw. 2020), reconsideration denied, No. SCWC-15-0000325, 2020 WL 1903848
(Haw. Mar. 27, 2020) (“When evaluating the validity of such clauses, we “examine[ ] whether [they] violate public
policy.”); Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1199 (“the clause must not contravene public policy.”); 8 W ILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21
(4th ed. May 2021 Update).
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liability for intentional torts or gross negligence.223 Courts also have refused to enforce
exculpatory clauses in private contracts that implicate or affect the public interest.224 Both
of these bases for nonenforcement are raised by cryopreservation agreement exculpatory
clauses.
1.

Exculpatory Clauses that Violate Public Policy

Courts should exercise caution when invalidating exculpatory clauses on policy grounds.225
Generally, exculpatory clauses have been found to violate public policy when the clause
violates a statute, is contrary to a substantial public interest, or is the product of unequal
bargaining power.226 However, there is no universal, bright-line rule that may be used to
determine when an exculpatory clause violates public policy, because public policy is
based on flexible societal expectations.227 Acknowledging the fact that public policy is an
“amorphous concept”, Professor Williston, in his treatise on contract law, explained when
an exculpatory clause typically will be unenforceable because the clause violates public
policy:
Despite this [lack of a clear public policy test], it may be broadly stated
that whether a particular agreement or provision is void as contrary to
public policy depends on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the making of the agreement; society's expectations; the identity and
nature of the parties involved, including their relative education,
experience, sophistication, and economic status; and the nature of the
transaction itself, including the subject matter, the existence or absence of
competition, the relative bargaining strength and negotiating ability of the
economically weaker party, and the terms of the agreement itself,
including whether it was arrived at through arm's length negotiation or on
terms dictated by the stronger party and on an adhesive, take-it-or-leave-it

223 Tayar,, 47 A.3d at 1202 (”[T]he overwhelming majority of our sister states find releases for reckless conduct are
against public policy.”); Jijun, 463 P.3d at 927 (“[O]ne cannot exempt himself from such liability for harm that is caused
either intentionally or recklessly.”); 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 60 A.3d at 24 (stating a clause may not excuse a party from
liability for reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (Am. Law
Inst. 1981)(“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy.”); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:24 (4th ed. May 2021 Update)(“An attempted exemption
from liability for a future intentional tort or crime or for a future willful or grossly negligent act is generally held void.”).
But see Valeo, 500 A.2d at 493 (“The language of the exculpatory clause was broad enough to exclude liability for all
degrees of negligence [including gross negligence].”).
224 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:23 (4th ed. May 2021 Update); Tunkl v. regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 44445 (Cal. 1963); Hunter v. Am. Rentals, Inc., 371 P.2d 131, 133 (Kan. 1962)(stating trailer hitch rental company “owed a
duty, not only to the plaintiff but also to the general public, to see that the trailer hitch was properly installed and the trailer
properly attached thereto. ......”).
225 See Banfield v. Louis, 589 So. 2d 441, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Williams, 17
So. 2d 98, 101–02 (Fla. 1944).
226 Jijun, 463 P.3d at 927; see also Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1199 (stating exculpatory clause cannot violate public policy and
“each party must be a free bargaining agent so the contract is not one of adhesion.”); Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274 (courts
will consider public policy and “relative bargaining power of the parties”); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811
S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991)(“Unless a private contract tends to harm the public good, public interest, or public welfare,
or to conflict with the constitution, laws, or judicial decisions of Tennessee, it does not violate public policy.”).
227 See Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 275 (noting that public policy is “difficult to articulate” and is based on “flexible”
societal expectations that “change over time”); see also 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 60 A.3d at 24 (stating when deciding whether
an exculpatory clause violates public policy, “[w]e determine what constitutes the public interest under the ‘totality of the
circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.’”).
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basis.228
Courts do not examine exculpatory clauses in isolation. Instead, courts look at the contract
as a whole, the nature of the transaction, and the surrounding circumstances.229 Exculpatory
clauses often are strictly construed against the party they benefit, especially when the clause
benefits the drafter.230 The terms in the clause must be clear and unambiguous.231
Exculpatory clauses will not defeat claims which are not explicitlycovered by their terms,
and the clause must spell out the intention of the parties with particularity.232 Regarding the
relative bargaining strength of the parties, exculpatory clauses will not be enforced in
private contracts when there is vast disparity in the parties’ bargaining power.”233 Although
such disparity cannot be measured using a precise rule, several courts have noted that two
“key criteria” are “the importance of the service at issuefor the physical or economic wellbeing of the party signing the agreement and the amountof free choice that party has in
seeking alternate services.”234 For example, although all standardized forms are not per se
invalid, “a standardized form offered on a take-it-or- leave-it basis may be invalid if there
was great disparity of bargaining power, no opportunity for negotiation, and the services
could not reasonably be obtained

228 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:22 (4th ed. May 2021 Update); Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 272.
229 Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2021) (“ We must construe a contract ‘as a whole,
viewing particular terms or provisions in the context of the entire agreement.’” ), (quoting Matthews v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 51 N.E.3d 753, 776 (Ill. 2016)); see also Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274 (“[E]nforceability of an exculpatory
agreement should be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances....... ”); Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v.
Holland Const. Co., 582 P.2d 1111, 1120 (Kan. 1978)(“In determining the enforceability of any such exculpatory clauses,
the trial court may consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution and performance of the contract. . .
.”); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21 (4th ed. May 2021 Update); see also 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:21
(May 2021 Update).
230 Frizzell, 415 P.3d at 346 (“[C]ourts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability and construe such provisions
strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that person is the preparer of the document.”); Horne, 987 F.3d
at 718 (same); Boise Mode, LLC, 294 P.3d at 1119 (same); Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 576, 787 S.E.2d 498,
516 (2016)(same). Also, in many jurisdictions, a party who materially breaches a contract cannot take advantage of the
terms of the contract which benefit him, such as an exculpatory clause. See, e.g., Horne, 987 F.3d at 718, (citing Goldstein
v. Lustig, 507 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (same); Builder's Concrete Co. of Morton v. Fred Faubel & Sons, Inc.,
373 N.E.2d 863, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (same).
231 Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274 (“[C]larity of the exculpatory language, which should be clear, unambiguous, and
unmistakable about what the party who signs the agreement is giving up.”); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:21 (4th ed.
May 2021 Update); Boise Mode, LLC, 294 P.3d at 1119 (stating exculpatory clause “must speak clearly and directly to the
conduct to be immunized from liability.”); Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Const. Co., 582 P.2d 1111, 1119 (Kan.
1978)(explaining exculpatory clause must use “clear and unequivocal language”).
232 Horne, 987 F.3d at 718. For example, a clause which attempted to relieve a party of liability for any type of injury,
wherever it may occur, was found to lack clarity and was unenforceable. Jesse v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1, 7 (Idaho 2008)
(“The clause is too broad and does not speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the defendant intended to be
immunized.”); see also STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, ET AL, 1A AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 5:39, Preinjury
releases, Exculpatory Clauses, and Indemnification from Own Negligence (March 2021 Update) (stating unmistakable
language must be used and acknowledging the courts’ stringent standard).
233 Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 582 P.2d at 1119; see also Whittington v. Sowela Tech. Inst., 438 So. 2d 236, 242 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (explaining exculpatory clause unenforceable when “the circumstances attending the execution of the release
clearly show that the parties were not dealing at arm's length and upon an equal footing.”); 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 60 A.3d at
25 (stating clause enforced because both parties were commercially sophisticated but “[p]erhaps if there were evidence that
the contract was a contract of adhesion, ‘drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-it-orleave-it’ basis to the weaker party who had no real opportunity to bargain about its terms,’ we would scrutinize the
exculpatory language differently.”); see also STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, ET AL, 1A AMERICAN LAW OF
TORTS § 5:39, Preinjury releases, Exculpatory Clauses, and Indemnification from Own Negligence (Mar. 2021 Update)
(addressing disparate bargaining power regarding exculpatory clauses).
234
Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274-76; Schmidt v. United States, 912 P.2d 871, 874 (Okla. 1996); see also Schlobohm v.
Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925 (Minn. 1982).
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elsewhere.”235 Finally, when an exculpatory clause relieves a party of an express promise
at the core of the agreement, courts also have refused to enforce the clause on the ground
that it would render the contract Illusory.236
Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island,237discussed earlier,238 addressed
the enforceability of a clinic’s exculpatory clause in a consolidated action after three
couples cryopreserved embryos were lost or destroyed by the hospitals IVF clinic. In a
motion for summary judgment, the hospital argued that several agreements the couples
signed placed the risk of loss or destruction of the stored embryos on the plaintiffs.239 The
first agreement, called “Informed Consent: In Vitro Fertilization” stated “a laboratory
accident may result in loss or damage to the fertilized egg(s) or pre-embryo(s).”240 A second
agreement titled “Informed Consent for Transfer of Frozen Eggs to the Biological Mother”
contained identical language regarding the possibility of a “laboratory accident.”241 Finally,
a third agreement which the couples signed, titled “Informed Consent and Contract for
Embryo Freezing,” stated: “Husband and Wife acknowledge, understand and agree that
despite the Hospital, its physicians and its employees proceeding with due care, it is
possible that a laboratory accident in the Hospital may result in loss or damage to one or
more of said frozen embryos”242 Plaintiffs argued, based on the contractual language, that
they did not assume the risk of Defendant's negligence, even in the event ofa “laboratory
accident.”243 The court noted the parties disagreed in their interpretation of the exculpatory
language, in particular, regarding the meaning of “laboratory accident.” 244 Because the
agreement was not sufficiently specific and the parties intention to hold them harmless was
not “clearly and unequivocally expressed in the contract”, the court refused to rule that
plaintiff’s assumed the risk of embryo loss.245 The court noted that the parties differing
interpretation of the contractual language created a genuine issue of material facton the
issue of whether the couples assumed the risk of embryo loss and destruction.246

235 Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274; see also Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Court, 556 P.2d 473, 475–76 (Colo.
1976)(same); LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Board, 360 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanny
Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925, 926 (N.Y. 1961) (same); Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925 (Minn. 1982)
(same).
236 Horne, 987 F.3d at 718 (“[A]n exculpatory clause may not relieve a party of material breach of an express promise at
the core of the contract, because that would render the contract illusory.”); Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois,
N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ill. 2004) (“A party cannot promise to act in a certain manner in one portion of a contract and then
exculpate itself from liability for breach of that very promise in another part of the contract” because the contract would be
rendered illusory.), (citing Shorr Paper Prod., Inc. v. Aurora Elevator, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990)
(“[W]e have endeavored to prevent Aurora's duties under the agreement from becoming illusory and meaningless, a result
which would be occasioned if Aurora were not liable for failing to perform its obligations sufficiently.”); see also Frizzell,
415 P.3d at 346 (explaining exculpatory clause that shielded trustee from liability for all actions taken in his role as trustee
rendered his obligations illusory and violated public policy in direct contravention of statute).
237
Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784.
238
See supra Parts III.A.3. and IV.B.
239 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *11.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at *12.
245 Id. at *13.
246 Id.
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As evidenced by the court’s ruling in Frisina, any analysis of exculpatory clauses in
cryopreservation agreements must begin by acknowledging the language contained in an
exculpatory clause is crucial to any determination regarding the clause’s enforceability.
Because exculpatory clause language and the particular circumstances surrounding each
agreement varies, the determination of an exculpatory clause’s enforceability must be made
on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, several useful, general observations regarding
exculpatory clauses may be made: First, exculpatory clauses in cryopreservation
agreements play an important role in risk management and are vital to the survival of the
ART industry. The need for risk management recently was highlighted by an extremely
large plaintiffs’ verdict in California in the very first jury trial involving destroyed
reproductive material.247 Courts have echoed this sentiment in several cases when
upholding the enforceability of disposition clauses in cryopreservation agreements:
“Explicit agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. They are all the more
necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive choice, where the intangible
costs of any litigation are simply incalculable Written agreements also provide the
certainty needed for effective operation of IVF programs.”248 Without enforceable
exculpatory clauses in cryopreservation agreements, the cost of doing business – including
the cost of insurance – most likely would skyrocket and be unpredictable. In addition,
without the protection that such clauses afford to IVF clinics, patient costs for IVF also
undoubtedly would rise.
Second, if a contract merely lists the risks involved with cryopreservation, that list, standing
alone, may be held insufficient to establish aspiring parents’ intent to hold defendant
harmless when those risks materialize. The intent of the parties regarding those risks must
be spelled out with particularity.249 Potential claims must be specificallycovered.250 Terms
in the agreement must be clear and unambiguous.251 For example, evenwhen a jurisdiction
permits a party to exculpate itself regarding future negligence, the exculpatory clause must
make this point clear using express and unequivocal language.252Therefore, phrases such
as “laboratory accident” and “human error” may create problems for a clinic who wishes
to rely upon an exculpatory clause to escape negligence liability. Courts require “free and
knowing assent” to terms contained in the agreement, in particular when private service
contracts implicate public interest.253 The aspiring parents should be

247 See Associated Press, supra note 6. Although the verdict was large, it must be noted the jury found the tank
manufacturer 90% responsible for plaintiffs’ damages and the fertility clinic only 10% responsible. Id.
248 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 46 (same); Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506-07 (same).
249 See authorities cited supra notes 232-233.
250 See authorities cited supra notes 232-233.
251 See authorities cited supra notes 232-233.
252

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 234 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Vinnell Co.
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 340 P.2d 604, 607 (Cal. 1959)); see also Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d
330, 337 (Mo. 1996) (“The exculpatory language must effectively notify a party that he or she is releasing the other party
from claims arising from the other party's own negligence.”); Sweeney v. City of Bettendorf, 762 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa
2009) (same); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal. 1964) (same); Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley
Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1189 (Pa. 2010) (same); Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 79 S.E.2d 185, 190 (N.C.
1953) (same); Carstens v. W. Pipe & Steel Co., 252 P. 939, 941 (Wash. 1927) (same). However, some jurisdictions hold
use of the term “negligence” is not required. See, e.g., Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So. 3d 256, 268 (Fla.
2015) (citing cases from jurisdictions where exculpatory clauses are not required to use the term “negligence”).
253 Jijun Yin, 463 P.3d at 926 (explaining exculpatory clause must be “knowingly and willingly made”). For a general
discussion of this point, see 8 W ILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 19:21, 19:23; see also McCarn v. Pac. Bell Directory, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (listing characteristics which mark a contract as involving the public interest),
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aware from the clear language of the contract that they are assuming these risks, not the
IVF clinic or cryopreservation facility.
Third, regarding unequal bargaining power, one can hardly deny that the clinics and ART
practitioners have the upper hand regarding exculpatory clauses, which are typically nonnegotiable and contained in pre-printed forms. However, use of such forms need not render
the agreement unenforceable. When assessing disparity in bargaining power, courtshave
examined “the importance of the service at issue for the physical or economic well- being
of the party signing the agreement and the amount of free choice that party has in seeking
alternate services.254 As to the first concern, most would agree that the IVF processthrough
which couples achieve pregnancy, including cryopreservation of reproductive material, is
important to the physical and economic well-being of the parties signing the agreement.
Regarding the second concern, counsel may choose to add language to the agreement which
indicates the aspiring parents’ assent to the exculpatory clause was a deliberate, free choice
made to keep costs of service affordable. For example, one practitioner suggested this
language, although not in the IVF context: “I have considered that if this waiver of liability
was not as broad as it is, the cost for my use of the facility [or participation in the event]
would be considerably higher, and as I do not wish to pay a considerably higher cost, I
waive the right to bargain for different waiver of liability terms.”255 To avoid the
appearance that the agreement was an adhesion contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, the agreement also should expressly acknowledge thataspiring parents investigated
available fertility clinics, had a choice of fertility clinics, freely chose clinic “X”, and are
aware they may discontinue participation in clinic “X’s IVF program at any time.256 The
agreement also should include terms regarding transfer of any stored reproductive material
to another clinic, which will lessen the likelihood that courts will perceive the aspiring
parents’ participation in an IVF program, once begun,as being “locked-in” and coercive.
Finally, broad, sweeping language frequently used in cryopreservation contracts, which
attempts to excuse clinics and ART practitioners from any and all future liability, is
problematic and should be avoided. Sweeping exculpatory clauses that render the ART
practitioners and clinic storage facilities immune from any and all liability regarding the
key tasks they promised to perform which comprise the very heart of the agreement render
the agreement illusory.257 Unfortunately, many cryopreservation agreements contain such
(citing Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) (holding exculpatory clause in agreement
between hospital and patient implicated the public interest and was unenforceable)).
254 Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 274-76; Schmidt v. United States, 912 P.2d 871, 874 (Okla. 1996); see also Schlobohm, 326
N.W.2d at 925.
255 Alexander T. Pendleton, Enforceable Exculpatory Agreements: Do They Still Exist?, 78 WIS. LAW. at 16, 46 (NO. 8
Aug. 2005).
256 For example, the Boston IVF contract states, in pertinent part: “We acknowledge that we, the undersigned, are
voluntarily participating in treatment at Boston IVF in order to conceive a child through IVF ........ “ Boston IVF, supra note
20, at 5. The contract also states “By signing the document, we acknowledge we have had a thorough discussion with our
Boston IVF physician. This discussion included information on the risks, benefits, complications, and alternative to
embryo freezing.” Id.
257 Horne, 987 F.3d at 718 (“[A]n exculpatory clause may not relieve a party of material breach of an express promise at
the core of the contract, because that would render the contract illusory.”); Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d at 415 (“A
party cannot promise to act in a certain manner in one portion of a contract and then exculpate itself from liability for
breach of that very promise in another part of the contract” because the contract would be rendered illusory.), (citing Shorr
Paper Prod., Inc. v. Aurora Elevator, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) ([W]e have endeavored to prevent
Aurora's duties under the agreement from becoming illusory and meaningless, a result which would be occasioned if
Aurora were not liable for failing to perform its obligations sufficiently.”); see also Frizzell, 415 P.3d at 346 (explaining
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sweeping language and attempt to immunize ART practitioners from all conduct related to
the very core of the agreement. For example, one typical cryopreservation agreement states,
in pertinent part: “[the clinic] its affiliate laboratories, or any of its employees shall not be
for any destruction, damage, or loss to our embryos as a result of freezing, maintenance,
storage, removal from storage, thawing and/or delivery ”258 Arguably,
such language renders the agreement illusory. If the clinic’s obligation is to freeze and store
the reproductive material, yet they have no liability for any conduct relating to freezing and
storage, then they are immunizing themselves from all liability related to their core
obligation. After reading such language, one is left to ask, is there any aspect of the
cryopreservation process at all for which the clinic assumes responsibility? What risks of
the cryopreservation process, if any, will be borne by the clinic? Are any damages available
to plaintiffs in the event of damage, loss, or destruction of their cryopreserved reproductive
material? Such sweeping exculpatory language should not be enforced. A clinic should not
be able to promise to freeze and store reproductive material – which is the heart of the
parties’ agreement – and then exculpate itself from all liability for breach of that very
promise. As courts have noted: “This is a specific duty that defendant assumed in the
contract, and it formed the heart of the parties' agreement. A party cannot promise toact in a
certain manner in one portion of a contract and then exculpate itself from liability for breach
of that very promise in another part of the contract.” 259 Clinics must use care toensure their
exculpatory clause is not so broad and sweeping as to render the agreement illusory.260 One
obvious way clinics may avoid this problem is to assume a duty of due careregarding their
core obligations under the agreement.261
2.

Exculpatory Clauses that Implicate or Affect Public Policy

Although courts may find an individual exculpatory clause may violate public policy,
perhaps because the clause was unclear or a great disparity existed in the parties’ bargaining
power, the courts also have found exculpatory clauses unenforceable when the agreement
itself is one which affects or implicates public policy.262 Typical agreements which affect
exculpatory clause that shielded trustee from liability for all actions taken in his role as trustee rendered his obligations
illusory and violated public policy in direct contravention of statute)).
258 California Center, supra note 171, at 1; see also Boston IVF, supra note 20, at 1 (“not be liable for any destruction,
damage, or loss to our embryos as a result of freezing, maintenance, storage, removal from storage, thawing, and/or
delivery ....... ”).
259 Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d at 415, (citing Shorr Paper Products, Inc., 555 N.E.2d at 738).
260 Horne, 987 F.3d at 718 (“[A]n exculpatory clause may not relieve a party of material breach of an express promise at
the core of the contract, because that would render the contract illusory.”); Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d at 415 (“A
party cannot promise to act in a certain manner in one portion of a contract and then exculpate itself from liability for
breach of that very promise in another part of the contract” because the contract would be rendered illusory.), (citing Shorr
Paper Prod., Inc., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 14, 555 N.E.2d at 738 (“[W]e have endeavored to prevent Aurora's duties under the
agreement from becoming illusory and meaningless, a result which would be occasioned if Aurora were not liable for
failing to perform its obligations sufficiently.”)); see also Frizzell, 415 P.3d at 346 (explaining exculpatory clause that
shielded trustee from liability for all actions taken in his role as trustee rendered his obligations illusory and violated public
policy in direct contravention of statute).
261 See, e.g., Ovation Fertility, supra note 20, at 3 (“Ovation's obligation to Client is to exercise reasonable care in
providing freezing and storage services as set forth in this Agreement.”).
262 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444-45, 447 (stating exculpatory clause in agreement between hospital and entering patient affects
the public interest and is unenforceable); Hunter v. Am. Rentals, Inc., 371 P.2d 131, 133 (Kan. 1962) (stating trailer hitch
rental company “owed a duty, not only to the plaintiff but also to the general public, to see that the trailer hitch was
properly installed and the trailer properly attached thereto....... ”); Philippine Airlines, Inc., 234 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (holding
contract between two highly sophisticated airline corporations was not contrary to the public interest); Ciofalo, 177 N.E.2d
at 927 (stating exculpatory clause in gym membership contract was valid and affected “no overriding public interest”). For
a general discussion of this topic, see 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:23 (4th ed. May 2021 Update).
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the public interest include those regarding public service obligations, such as public
utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and public warehousemen, and also any agreement
deemed “so important to the public good that an exculpatory clause would be patently
offensive, such that the common sense of the entire community would ... pronounce it
invalid.”263 Although no universal test exists to determine whether a private contract affects
the public interest, many jurisdictions apply the factors used in Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California,264 or some variation thereof,265 to determine whether an
exculpatory clause is unenforceable because the contract implicates the public interest:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation. [footnote omitted] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in
performing a service of great importance to the public, [ footnote omitted]
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the
public. [footnote omitted] The party holds himself out as willing to
perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least
for any member coming within certain established standards. [footnote
omitted] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic
setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his services. [footnote omitted] In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation, [ footnote omitted] and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and
obtain protection against negligence. [footnote omitted] Finally, as a result
of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under
the control of the seller, [footnote omitted] subject to the risk of
carelessness by the seller or his agents.266

263 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 60 A.3d at 23-24.
264 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–46.
265 See Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo.1981) (using the Tunkl factors to establish “the existence of a duty to the
public” but then adding three additional factors: (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly
entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.”); see also Wolf
v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1994) (adopting a totality of the circumstances approach); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.,
76 P.3d 1098, 1109 (N.M. 2003) (adopting the Tunkl factors as “guidance”); Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1050
(Vt. 2011)(Tunkl factors are “relevant considerations.”); Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 744 (Conn.
2005)(“[O]ur analysis is guided, but not limited, by the Tunkl factors”); Perry v. Town of E. Haddam, No. CV146012285,
2016 WL 3266053, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 19, 2016) (using a totality of circumstances approach and the
six Tunkl factors).
266 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–46; accord K.N. v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-39, 2018 WL 6505395, at *10 (D.
Utah Dec. 11, 2018) (adopting the Tunkl standard); Borders v. Alabama Power Co., 547 So. 2d 446, 447 (Ala. 1989)
(same); Moore v. Hartley Motor. Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 631 (Alaska 2001)(same); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431
(Tenn.1977)(same); Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163, 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd. 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga.
1981)(same); Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 758 P.2d 968, 971-72 (Wash. 1988) (same); R-1 Assocs., Inc. v.
Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 91-7417-E, 1995 WL 517554, at *4 (Mass. Super. Aug. 16, 1995) (same);
Lucero v. Van Wie, 598 N.W.2d 893, 897 (S.D. 1999) (same). But see Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 273 (ruling the Tunkl
factors “remain instructive and may be considered when relevant” but are “too rigid” because they “fail[] to consider all the
relevant circumstances.”); Wolf, 644 A.2d at 527 (same); Hanks, 276 Conn. at 330, 885 A.2d at 744 (“[O]ur analysis is
guided, but not limited, by the Tunkl factors.”); Perry, 2016 WL 3266053, at *7 (using a totality of circumstances approach
and the six Tunkl factors); Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1109 (adopting the Tunkl factors as “guidance”); Glassford, 35 A.3d at
1050 (holding Tunkl factors are “relevant considerations.”).
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All factors need not be present to render the exculpatory clause unenforceable. 267 Even
jurisdictions which have criticized the Tunkl factors as being too restrictive, have found the
factors remain helpful and instructive.268 In Tunkl, a patient sued two physicians and a
hospital for negligence, seeking damages for personal injury.269 Relying upon the release
which plaintiff had to sign in order to be treated at the hospital, the jury entered judgment
in favor of the hospital and its employees.270 Using the six factors set out above, the court
held “the hospital-patient contract clearly falls within the category of agreements affecting
the public interest.”271 The court noted the agreement met all six factors. The institution,
a hospital, was subject to and suitable for regulation; services were offered to members of
the public who had a specific need; the hospital held itself out to the public to offer such
services; the hospital held a decisive advantage in terms of bargaining and the terms of the
agreement were not the subject of negotiation; and the patient was placed in control of the
hospital and was subject to their negligence.272
The six factors used in Tunkl to invalidate an exculpatory clause also pose a threat to
exculpatory clauses in cryopreservation contracts. Cryopreservation agreements are likely
to meet all six Tunkl factors, although not every factor must be present to declare an
agreement unenforceable. First, like the hospital in Tunkl, many IVF clinics are in hospitals
and, regardless of hospital affiliation, facilities offering services to the public. As a result,
they are subject to regulation.273 In fact, there have been calls for increased regulation of
ART274 and many states have passed legislation addressing various aspects of ART. 275
Second, IVF clinics that cryopreserve reproductive material are performing a service that
is very important to the public and is a matter of necessity for many individuals. The right

267 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447 (“[T]he agreement need only fulfill some of the characteristics above outlined [to implicate
public policy and be unenforceable].”).
268 Copeland, 565 S.W.3d at 273 (ruling the Tunkl factors “remain instructive and may be considered when relevant” but
are “too rigid” because they “fail[] to consider all the relevant circumstances.”); Wolf, 644 A.2d at 527 (same); Hanks, 276
Conn. at 330, 885 A.2d at 744 (“[O]ur analysis is guided, but not limited, by the Tunkl factors”); Perry, 2016 WL 3266053,
at *7 (using a totality of circumstances approach and the six Tunkl factors); Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1109 (adopting the
Tunkl factors as “guidance”); Glassford, 35 A.3d at 1050 (holding Tunkl factors are “relevant considerations.”).
269 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 447.
272 Id.
273 For a thorough discussion of this topic, see David Adamson, M.D., Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies
in the United States, FERTILITY AND STERILITY, Volume 78, Issue 5 (Nov. 1, 2002),
https://www.fertstert.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0015-0282%2802%2904199-7; Wendy Y. Chang & Alan H. DeCherney,
History of Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) in the USA: A Work in Progress, HUMAN FERTILITY
Volume 6, Issue 2 (May 2003).
274 See, e.g., Lucy Frith & Eric Blyth, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the USA: Is More Regulation Needed?,
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE, at 516 Volume 29, Issue 4 (2014) (“[T]he regulatory structure in the USA fails to
provide an adequate mechanism for ensuring the ethical and safe conduct of ART services, and that more comprehensive
regulation is required.” ).
275 See Laura S. Langley, J.D. & Joseph W. Blackston, M.D., J.D., Sperm, Egg, and A Petri Dish Unveiling the
Underlying Property Issues Surrounding Cryopreserved Embryos, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 193–94 (2006) (discussing state
legislation regarding cryopreserved reproductive material). In some states, statutes have identified the legal status of
reproductive material. See, e.g., Polina M. Dostalik, Embryo "Adoption"? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal
Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 876 (2011) (discussing Louisiana and Missouri statutes that recognize an
embryo as “a person”); see also McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 147-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing Missouri
statutes regarding the status of frozen pre-embryos); Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues Surrounding
Embryos and Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 55, 71 (2018)
(discussing legislative attempts to protect cryopreserved reproductive material such as embryos).

143

to procreate is fundamental,276and thousands of individuals freeze embryos or other
reproductive material each year in the hope they may later have their own biological
child.277 The importance of cryopreservation is particularly evident when one considers
cryopreservation frequently is used by individuals who no longer are fertile due to age or
cancer treatments. Third, IVF clinics offer their services, including cryopreservation of
reproductive material, to members of the public as a means to achieve a delayed pregnancy.
Members of the public who use IVF are referred to as “patients.”278 The American Society
for Reproductive Medicine acknowledges that IVF and cryopreservation of reproductive
materials involves healthcare professionals and requires medical expertise 279 Fourth, the
IVF clinics exercise superior bargaining power and offer an exculpatory clause that usually
is not open to negotiation. Typically, no bargaining takes place when the cryopreservation
agreements are signed. In fact, most cryopreservation agreements are offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis. Finally, the property of the patient is placed in the care of the clinic and
is subject to carelessness by the clinic. The clinic prepares the reproductive material for
storage, controls the freezing process, operates the cryopreservation tanks, and controls the
entire storage process, including the operation and maintenance of essential equipment. As
a result, it is highly likely, as in Tunkl, a court will rule that a cryopreservation contract
between two private parties implicates the public interest and, therefore, the agreement’s
exclusionary clause is unenforceable, at least in part.
While broad, sweeping cryopreservation exculpatory clauses should not be enforced,
reasonable exculpatory clauses in which a clinic acknowledges and accepts a duty of due
care regarding their core obligations should be upheld as necessary to the health and
survival of the ART industry. This is especially true of clauses whereby a clinic exculpates
itself from liability for losses caused by acts of God and storage tank malfunctions. One
recent study showed that eighty-four percent of the one-hundred-thirty-three cases filed for
loss or destruction of cryopreserved embryos between January 2009 and June of 2019
involved losses due to storage tank failure.280 While clinics should exercise due care in
monitoring and maintaining storage tanks, they arguably should not be forced into the
position of a product insurer. Clinic liability in the event of tank failure should be limited
to circumstances where the clinic failed to exercise due care, such as when a tank failure
went unnoticed for days because a clinic employee turned off a tank temperature
alarm.281As courts have noted, written agreements “provide the certainty needed for
effective operation of IVF programs.”282 To find all exculpatory clauses unenforceable in
the cryopreservation context because the agreements implicate public policy would
essentially make the clinics insurers of the stored reproductive material.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts should award consequential damages for emotional disturbance when a
defendant’s breach of contract results in the loss or destruction of the reproductive
material stored for the purpose of achieving a pregnancy. In the overwhelming majority
of breach of contract cases involving the loss or destruction of reproductive material
stored to achieve a later pregnancy, the nature of the transaction, the purpose of the
contract, and the surrounding circumstances put defendants on notice at the time of
contracting that serious emotional disturbance was “particularly likely” to result from a
breach. This is particularly true when, due to plaintiffs age or illness, the loss realistically
destroys plaintiff’s opportunity to have their own biological child.
Although exculpatory clauses used in cryopreservation agreements play an important role
in risk management and are vital to the survival of the ART industry, broad, sweeping
exculpatory clauses which immunize ART clinics and practitioners from any and all
liability related to the very core of the agreement render the agreement illusory and
should be avoided. Exculpatory clauses should acknowledge ART clinics and
practitioners accept a duty of due care; otherwise, the exculpatory clause runs the risk of
contravening public policy. To be enforceable, exculpatory clause language should be
clear and precise. The language also should identify with specificity which risks are
being assumed by aspiring parents and which risks are assumed by the clinic. Clinics
should take care to address the perceived disparity in bargaining power and the
appearance that the agreement was an adhesion contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Cryopreservation agreements should offer the aspiring parents’ choices and
language contained in the exculpatory clause should indicate the aspiring parents’ assent
was a deliberate, free choice made to keep costs of service affordable.
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